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The least discussed element of District of Columbia v. Heller might ultimately be
the most important:  the battle between the majority and dissent over the use of
categoricalism and balancing in the construction of constitutional doctrine.  In
Heller, Justice Scalia’s categoricalism essentially prevailed over Justice Breyer’s
balancing approach.  But as the opinion itself demonstrates, Second Amendment
categoricalism raises extremely difficult and still-unanswered questions about how
to draw and justify the lines between protected and unprotected “Arms,” people,
and arms-bearing purposes.  At least until balancing tests appear in Second
Amendment doctrine—as they almost inevitably will—the future of the
Amendment will depend almost entirely on the placement and clarity of these cate-
gories.  And unless the Court better identifies the core values of the Second
Amendment, it will be difficult to give the categories any principled justification.
Heller is not the first time the Court has debated the merits of categorization and
balancing, nor are Justices Scalia and Breyer the tests’ most famous champions.
Decades ago, Justices Black and Frankfurter waged a similar battle in the First
Amendment context, and the echoes of their struggle continue to reverberate in free
speech doctrine.  But whereas the categorical view triumphed in Heller, Justice
Frankfurter and the First Amendment balancers won most of their battles.  As a
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result, modern First Amendment doctrine is a patchwork of categorical and bal-
ancing tests, with a tendency toward the latter.  The First and Second Amendments
are often presumed to be close cousins, and courts, litigants, and scholars will
almost certainly continue to turn to the First Amendment for guidance in devel-
oping a Second Amendment standard of review.  But while free speech doctrine
may be instructive, it also tells a cautionary tale:  Above all, it suggests that unless
the Court better identifies the core values of the Second Amendment, the Second
Amendment’s future will be even murkier than the First Amendment’s past.
This Article draws the Amendments together, using the development of categori-
calism and balancing tests in First Amendment doctrine to describe and predict
what Heller’s categoricalism means for the present and future of Second
Amendment doctrine.  It argues that the Court’s categorical line drawing in Heller
creates intractable difficulties for Second Amendment doctrine and theory and that
the majority’s categoricalism neither reflects nor enables a clear view of the
Amendment’s core values, whatever they may be.
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INTRODUCTION
In the wake of District of Columbia v. Heller,1 courts and scholars
are faced with the task of operationalizing a new constitutional right.
Litigants already are preparing for the next set of legal battles, which
ultimately will prove even more critical to the scope of gun rights than
Heller’s holding that the Second Amendment protects an “individual”
right to bear arms disconnected from any militia service.2  These con-
flicts—whose initial skirmishes have already begun—will eventually
determine the standard of review applicable to Second Amendment
claims and thus shape both the scope of the right and the govern-
ment’s power to burden it.  In attempting to construct this new consti-
tutional doctrine, foes and supporters of gun control have increasingly
returned to arguments developed in past constitutional struggles,
especially those involving the First Amendment.  The familiarity of
that constitutional terrain, and Heller’s endorsement of a “categor-
ical” rather than “balancing” approach to Second Amendment protec-
tion, indicate that the fight over gun control after Heller is likely to
involve maneuvers perfected decades ago during the battle over cate-
gorical and balancing approaches to free speech doctrine.  This Article
argues that Heller’s categoricalism neither reflects nor enables a clear
view of the Second Amendment’s core values—whatever they may
1 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
2 This issue, which dominates the pre-Heller literature, has frequently been mislabeled
as a debate between “individual” and “collective” viewpoints. See, e.g., Robert H.
Churchill, Gun Regulation, the Police Power, and the Right To Keep Arms in Early
America:  The Legal Context of the Second Amendment, 25 LAW & HIST. REV. 139, 140
(2007) (“[T]he bulk of this scholarly literature can be subsumed within the collective rights
and individual rights frameworks.”).  The District of Columbia argued, and the dissenting
Justices recognized:
The question presented by this case is not whether the Second Amendment
protects a “collective right” or an “individual right.”  Surely it protects a right
that can be enforced by individuals.  But a conclusion that the Second Amend-
ment protects an individual right does not tell us anything about the scope of
that right.
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2822 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Saul Cornell, The Ironic Second
Amendment, 1 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 292, 307 (2008) (“For much of the twentieth century,
the debate over the Second Amendment was framed in simple dichotomous terms:  collec-
tive right v. individual right.  Scholarship on this topic no longer fits such a simplistic
model.”).
In any event, this Article, like Justice Breyer’s dissent in Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2848,
takes the “individual” right as a given and instead focuses on how that right may be consti-
tutionally regulated.
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be—and that Heller therefore fails to justify the constitutional catego-
ries it creates.  The future of the Second Amendment thus may be
even murkier than the past of the First.
The general consensus is that Heller failed to provide a frame-
work by which lower courts could judge the constitutionality of gun
control.3  Indeed, the two dissenting opinions criticized the majority as
leaving “for future cases the formidable task of defining the scope of
permissible regulations”4 and “leav[ing] the Nation without clear stan-
dards for resolving those challenges.”5  It is undoubtedly true that the
majority did not embrace the “traditionally expressed levels”6 of
review such as strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or rational basis
review—the familiar “tiers of scrutiny” that are closely associated
with the Warren Court and have long served as the building blocks of
constitutional doctrine.
3 See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 570 F. Supp. 2d 161, 163 (D. Me. 2008) (con-
cluding that Supreme Court “consciously left the appropriate level of scrutiny for another
day”); United States v. White, No. 07-00361-WS, 2008 WL 3211298, at *1 (S.D. Ala., Aug.
6, 2008) (noting lack of “any guidance concerning the proper legal standards to apply to
any scrutiny of [the ban on possession of firearms by those convicted of domestic violence]
under the Second Amendment”).  Others have stated:
[Because] the Heller majority declined to give a detailed accounting of the
proper standard of review to be used in subsequent Second Amendment cases,
litigants have a rare opportunity to write on a tabula much more rasa than is
ordinarily the case in constitutional litigation, while making use of recent
scholarship on the crafting of constitutional decision rules that implement con-
stitutional provisions.
Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Heller’s Future in the Lower Courts, 102 NW.
U. L. REV. 2035, 2035 (2008); see also J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the
Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 30), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1265118 (“[T]he actual holding of the opinion does not provide
much guidance for future cases.  The Court did not even provide a standard of review.”);
Richard Posner, In Defense of Looseness, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 2008, at 32, 34 (“All
that is clear is that an absolute ban on possessing a pistol is unconstitutional.  The other
restrictions that a government might want to impose are up for grabs.”); Linda Singer,
Court Misfired on Safety Case for Guns, LEGAL TIMES, June 30, 2008, at 53 (“The Court
failed to give guidance to the lawmakers who must evaluate current statutes and try to
abide by its ruling . . . .”); Heller’s Fallout:  The Court’s Decision Raises More Legal Ques-
tions Than It Answers, NAT’L J. ONLINE, July 17, 2008, http://www.nationaljournal.com/
njonline/ii_20080715_4338.php (describing lack of guidance for future as “one of the great
failings of the Heller decision”); Posting of Doug Kmiec to Convictions, http://
www.slate.com/blogs/blogs/convictions/archive/2008/07/08/what-the-heller-is-only-the
-supreme-court-s-liberty-enhanced.aspx (July 8, 2008, 06:00 EST) (noting Heller’s failure to
establish whether scope of “individually enforceable right” required a “militia-nexus”);
Robert A. Levy, District of Columbia v. Heller:  What’s Next?, CATO UNBOUND, July 14,
2008, http://www.cato-unbound.org/2008/07/14/robert-a-levy/district-of-columbia-v-heller
-whats-next/ (noting that Heller did not resolve standard of review despite considerable
attention to issue in various amicus briefs).
4 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2846 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
5 Id. at 2868 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
6 Id. at 2821 (majority opinion).
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But the search for the familiar may be leading courts and com-
mentators astray:  The central disagreement in Heller was a debate
not about strict scrutiny and rational basis review but rather about
categoricalism and balancing.  Fifty years ago, that same debate was at
the center of a doctrine-defining struggle over free speech, with
Justices Black and Frankfurter, respectively, advocating categorical
absolutism and interest-balancing approaches.7  Their debate still
reverberates in the First Amendment’s mix of balancing and categor-
ical tests, and, at least until Heller, free speech was the area of law
with which the conceptual distinction between categoricalism and bal-
ancing was most closely associated, both in doctrine and in scholar-
ship.8  Moreover, rightly or wrongly, the First and Second
Amendments have often been considered close cousins.  As a result,
courts, litigants, and scholars will almost certainly continue to turn to
First Amendment doctrine for guidance in developing Second
Amendment standards of review, as Justices Scalia and Breyer effec-
tively did in Heller by reprising the roles of Justices Black and
Frankfurter.  That reliance will be especially pronounced in light of
the near absence of relevant Second Amendment precedent.
In Heller itself, the Court rejected Justice Frankfurter’s balancing
approach and embraced a Justice Black–style categoricalism.  Fore-
shadowing at oral argument this preference for absolutism, Chief
Justice Roberts noted that “none of [the levels of scrutiny] appear[s]
in the Constitution” and that they instead “just kind of developed
over the years as sort of baggage that the First Amendment picked
up.”9  This dim assessment of First Amendment doctrine proved pro-
7 See infra Part I.B (describing both debate between Justices Black and Frankfurter
and continuing relevance of categoricalism despite triumph of balancing approach).
8 See Laurent B. Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424, 1429
(1962) [hereinafter Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance] (asserting that balancing
has “come to the fore largely in a single type of case:  that in which a compelled disclosure
of membership or other association may have a deterrent effect on the exercise of first
amendment freedoms”); Laurent B. Frantz, Is the First Amendment Law?  A Reply to
Professor Mendelson, 51 CAL. L. REV. 729, 729–38, 750–53 (1963) [hereinafter Frantz, Is
the First Amendment Law?] (discussing balancing and absolutism in free speech context);
Wallace Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First Amendment:  Absolutes in the Balance, 50
CAL. L.  REV. 821, 821 (1962) (same); see also Pierre J. Schlag, An Attack on Categorical
Approaches to Freedom of Speech, 30 UCLA L. REV. 671, 672 (1983) (discussing
“continuing controversy over whether first amendment adjudication should be grounded
on a categorical (and possibly absolute) theory or whether a balancing of competing inter-
ests is more appropriate”); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and
Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2418 (1996) (evaluating balancing
test that takes into account, not “whether the means are narrowly drawn to accomplish the
interest, [but] whether the means are nonetheless impermissible” but preferring “an
approach that operates through categorical rules”).
9 Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2738 (No. 07-290).
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phetic:  Rather than adopting one of the First Amendment’s many
Frankfurter-inspired balancing approaches, the majority endorsed a
categorical test under which some types of “Arms” and arms-usage
are protected absolutely from bans and some types of “Arms” and
people are excluded entirely from constitutional coverage.10
Justice Breyer’s dissent, by contrast, picked up the banner of bal-
ancing and argued for an approach that would ask whether the bur-
dens imposed by a particular gun control restriction are
disproportionate in light of the government’s legitimate interests in
regulation.11  The result was a remarkable colloquy between the
majority and dissent on the virtues and vices of categorical and bal-
ancing tests in constitutional doctrine.  Moreover, because Heller was
the Roberts Court’s first (and perhaps last) opportunity to paint con-
stitutional doctrine on a nearly blank canvas, the debate—and the
Court’s ultimate selection of a categorical palette—is notable for what
it says, not just about the Amendment, but about constitutional doc-
trine and the Court itself.
Building on an analysis of free speech doctrine and its evolution,
this Article argues that because Heller’s categoricalism is not based on
any possible core Second Amendment value, it threatens to stunt the
growth of coherent Second Amendment doctrine and theory.  Part I
briefly describes the differences and relationship between the categor-
ical and balancing approaches and illustrates how they manifest them-
selves in First Amendment doctrine.  Part II charts the development
of categorical and balancing tests in Second Amendment analysis, first
detailing the presumed connection between the First and Second
Amendments and then explaining how Heller transformed Justice
Black’s First Amendment categoricalism into a Second Amendment
framework.  Part II also argues that the Heller majority’s categorical
approach is likely to evolve—as First Amendment doctrine has—into
a patchwork of categorical and balancing tests, but that doing so in a
principled and coherent manner will require courts to identify more
clearly the core, guiding values of the Second Amendment.  Finally,
Part III addresses the future of Second Amendment categoricalism
and its relationship to common law adjudication.  This Part explains
how categories evolve and predicts how they might do so in the con-
text of the Second Amendment.  The discussion concludes by
describing what Heller’s endorsement of categoricalism might suggest
10 See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing Heller majority’s approach).
11 See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2847–48, 2854 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing whether
government regulation is “unreasonable or inappropriate in Second Amendment terms”);
see also infra Part II.B.2 (discussing Justice Breyer’s balancing approach).
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about the Roberts Court’s approach to the development of constitu-
tional doctrine and the role of the courts more generally.
I
CATEGORICALISM AND BALANCING IN FIRST
AMENDMENT DOCTRINE
This Part briefly describes the theoretical and practical differ-
ences between categorical and balancing approaches to constitutional
doctrine and then shows how they operate in practice.  Because this
distinction has received its most thorough treatment in the context of
the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause, which in turn has been
frequently linked to the Second Amendment, the analysis focuses on
free speech doctrine.
A. The Difference Between Categoricalism and Balancing
Judges and scholars often have intuited, and occasionally tried to
describe, the difference between categorical and balancing
approaches.  As always, the distinction is clearer in the telling than in
the doing.
Generally, balancing approaches set the individual’s interest in
asserting a right against the government’s interest in regulating it,
attach whatever weights are appropriate for the context, and deter-
mine which is weightier.  In contrast, categoricalism prohibits this kind
of weighing of interests in the individual case and asks only whether
the case falls inside certain predetermined, outcome-determinative
lines.  Balancing therefore “tends to collapse decisionmaking back
into the direct application of the background principle or policy to a
fact situation,” whereas categorization “binds a decisionmaker to
respond in a determinative way to the presence of delimited triggering
facts.”12  The difference between categorization and balancing thus
roughly tracks the familiar division between rules and standards:13
12 Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Foreword:  The Justices of
Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 24, 58 (1992) (citations omitted).
13 Sullivan described the debate thusly:
The Justices of rules are skeptical about reasoned elaboration and suspect that
standards will enable the Court to translate raw subjective value preferences
into law.  The Justices of standards are skeptical about the capacity of rules to
constrain value choice and believe that custom and shared understandings can
adequately constrain judicial deliberation in a regime of standards.
Id. at 27 (citations omitted); see also Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules,
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179 (1989) (arguing that adopting clear rules constrains judges
from acting on their political preferences in future cases based on “balancing”); Frederick
Schauer, Rules and the Rule of Law, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 645 (1991) (contrasting
rules- and content-based approaches to decisionmaking); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Stan-
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“Categorization corresponds to rules, balancing to standards.”14  In
Kathleen Sullivan’s description:
When categorical formulas operate, all the important work in litiga-
tion is done at the outset.  Once the relevant right and mode of
infringement have been described, the outcome follows, without
any explicit judicial balancing of the claimed right against the gov-
ernment’s justification for the infringement.  [When balancing pre-
dominates,] the judge’s job is to place competing rights and interests
on a scale and weigh them against each other.  Here the outcome is
not determined at the outset, but depends on the relative strength
of a multitude of factors.15
Categoricalism allows a judge to transform some background value
into a rule that will govern all subsequent cases inside the category
without any further reference to the background principle or value.16
The creation of the category cuts off future adjudicators from the
underlying value and prohibits the reweighing of interests.17
The distinction between categoricalism and balancing is easier to
describe than to maintain, and the relationship between the two is
complicated, as the discussion throughout this Article demonstrates.
In order to begin that analysis, however, it suffices to posit that both
the categorical and balancing approaches rely—albeit in different
ways—on some conception of underlying constitutional values.  Inter-
ests cannot be balanced without some common metric.  Categories
can, at least arguably,18 be applied in individual cases without refer-
dards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 398 (1985) (“The dialectic here [of rules v. standards] traces
the so-called balancing v. absolutism debate.”).
14 Sullivan, supra note 12, at 59; see also Frederick Schauer, Rules, the Rule of Law, and
the Constitution, 6 CONST. COMMENT. 69, 75 (1989) (“[A] rule necessarily applies its nor-
mative pressure to a category, a category that is the instantiation of some deeper justifica-
tion.”). But see Jeffrey L. Fisher, Categorical Requirements in Constitutional Criminal
Procedure, 94 GEO. L.J. 1493, 1495 n.15 (2006) (“A ‘balancing’ approach shares similarities
with, but is not identical to, judging by ‘standards.’”).
15 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-liberal Judging:  The Roles of Categorization and Bal-
ancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 293–94 (1992).
16 See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (categorically excluding
obscenity from First Amendment protection).  Kermit Roosevelt states:
In a striking number of cases the Court has forgotten the reasons behind the
particular rules and has come to treat them as nothing more than statements of
constitutional requirements.  This mistaken equation of judicial doctrine and
constitutional command tends to warp doctrine, frequently at significant cost
to constitutional values; it also distorts the relationship the Court has to other
governmental actors and to the American people.
Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification:  How the Law Becomes What the Court
Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1652 (2005).
17 Sullivan, supra note 12, at 57–58 (“Rules, once formulated, afford decisionmakers
less discretion than do standards.”).
18 I hold aside for the moment this question—made most famous by the “no vehicles in
the park” debate about whether the purpose behind a rule always informs the rule’s appli-
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ence to underlying values.  But the creation and justification of consti-
tutional categories—the problem the Court faced in Heller—is
critically dependent on constitutional values.  When a category does
not align with underlying values, absurdities such as significant over-
or underinclusion can undermine the category’s legitimacy and sta-
bility.  The Court’s failure to clearly identify any such values in Heller,
or to clarify the conflicts between them, makes its use of categori-
calism particularly problematic.
B. Echoes of the Debate in Free Speech Doctrine
Although the distinction between categoricalism and balancing
appears throughout constitutional law,19 it is associated most closely
with—and, at least until Heller, had the most direct effect on—the
First Amendment.20  Indeed, modern First Amendment doctrine
cation. See generally Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law:  A Reply to Professor
Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958) (arguing that purpose informs rule); H.L.A. Hart,
Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958) (arguing
that rules have their own meaning, separate from any background purposes).  For a
description of the Fuller-Hart debate, see Frederick Schauer, A Critical Guide to Vehicles
in the Park, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1109, 1110–11 (2008).
19 Compare Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689–93 (1988) (finding that separation of
powers challenges cannot be answered by reference to “rigid categories” and that Court
instead must employ more flexible standards), with id. at 733 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“Today’s decision on the basic issue of fragmentation of executive power is ungoverned by
rule, and hence ungoverned by law.”).  This debate has also taken place in the contentious
realm of detainment of U.S. citizens in the “war on terror.” See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542
U.S. 507 (2004) (plurality opinion).  There the plurality cited the Mathews test for proce-
dural due process:
Mathews dictates that the process due in any given instance is determined by
weighing the private interest that will be affected by the official action against
the Government’s asserted interest, including the function involved and the
burdens the Government would face in providing greater process.  The
Mathews calculus then contemplates a judicious balancing of these concerns,
through an analysis of the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the private
interest if the processes were reduced and the probable value, if any, of addi-
tional or substitute safeguards.
Id. at 529.  Justice Scalia strenuously objected to this use of balancing:
[The majority] claims authority to engage in this sort of “judicious balancing”
from Mathews v.  Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), a case involving . . . the
withdrawal of disability benefits!  Whatever the merits of this technique when
newly recognized property rights are at issue (and even there they are ques-
tionable), it has no place where the Constitution and the common law already
supply an answer.
Id. at 575–76 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
20 See Charles Fried, Two Concepts of Interests:  Some Reflections on the Supreme
Court’s Balancing Test, 76 HARV. L. REV. 755, 757 (1963) (“[I]t is particularly in respect of
claims involving constitutional protections of freedom of speech, press, association, and
religion that the controversy about the appropriateness of proceeding by a ‘balancing of
the interests’ has been most heated and most in need of analysis.”); Frederick Schauer, The
Boundaries of the First Amendment:  A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience,
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essentially tracks the battle lines between the categorical and bal-
ancing approaches.  This Section therefore begins by describing the
views of free speech’s leading categorizer and of its most committed
balancer and then identifies the echoes of their voices in the various
tests that constitute modern First Amendment doctrine.
The dominance of the categorization-balancing debate in First
Amendment law is due in large part to the eloquence and dedication
of its leading foils, Justices Black and Frankfurter,21 whose perform-
ances essentially went unmatched until Justices Scalia and Breyer
revived them in Heller.  In Justice Black’s famously absolutist view:
To apply the Court’s balancing test . . . is to read the First
Amendment to say “Congress shall pass no law abridging freedom
of speech, press, assembly and petition, unless Congress and the
Supreme Court reach the joint conclusion that on balance the
interest of the Government in stifling those freedoms is greater than
the interest of the people in having them exercised.” . . . [U]nless we
once again accept the notion that the Bill of Rights means what it
says and that this Court must enforce that meaning, I am of the
opinion that our great Charter of liberty will be more honored in
the breach than in the observance.22
Justice Black’s approach was categorical:  If an act of speech fell
within the scope of speech protected by the First Amendment, it was
protected from abridgement by the government.  But Justice Black’s
preference for categoricalism did not mean that he woud give all
speech-like acts complete immunity from regulation.  Justice Black
trimmed the most problematic results of his absolutist test by finding
categorical exceptions to the categorical rule.  Indeed, he was quicker
than many balancing-inclined Justices to find that certain speech acts
fell completely outside the bounds of the First Amendment.23
117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1765 (2004) (“The history of the First Amendment is the history
of its boundaries.”).
21 See generally MARK SILVERSTEIN, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITHS:  FELIX FRANKFURTER,
HUGO BLACK, AND THE PROCESS OF DECISIONMAKING (1984) (comparing Black’s desire
to confine judicial judgment with Frankfurter’s efforts to sanctify it); Fisher, supra note 14,
at 1526 (“Many scholars have likened the Court’s debates between absolutism and bal-
ancing to those a half-century ago between Justices Black and Frankfurter.”).
22 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 143–44 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting); see
also Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 61–65 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (“[T]he very
object of adopting [the Bill of Rights] was to put the freedoms protected there completely
out of the area of any congressional control that may be attempted through the exercise of
precisely those powers that are now being used to ‘balance’ the Bill of Rights out of
existence.”).
23 See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 522, 526 (1969) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (“It is a myth to say that any person has a constitutional right to say what he
pleases, where he pleases, and when he pleases.  Our Court has decided precisely the oppo-
site.”); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 151–52 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting) (“I do not
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Justice Frankfurter referred to the absolute approach as “a sono-
rous formula which is in fact only a euphemistic disguise for an
unresolved conflict.”24  In Dennis v.  United States,25 which has been
called the “arch-example” of free speech balancing,26  Justice
Frankfurter’s concurring opinion suggested that balancing was not
simply the best way but the only way to evaluate First Amendment
claims:  “Our judgment is thus solicited on a conflict of interests of the
utmost concern to the well-being of the country. . . . If adjudication is
to be a rational process, we cannot escape a candid examination of the
conflicting claims with full recognition that both are supported by
weighty title-deeds.”27  Frankfurter recognized that categories quickly
erode and surmised that balancing tests better reflected the complexi-
ties of free speech doctrine:
Absolute rules would inevitably lead to absolute exceptions, and
such exceptions would eventually corrode the rules.  The demands
of free speech in a democratic society as well as the interest in
national security are better served by candid and informed weighing
of the competing interests, within the confines of the judicial pro-
believe that any provision of the United States Constitution forbids any one of the 50
States of the Union, including Louisiana, to make it unlawful to stage ‘sit-ins’ or ‘stand-up’
in their public libraries for the purpose of advertising objections to the State’s public poli-
cies.”); see also William Van Alstyne, A Graphic Review of the Free Speech Clause, 70 CAL.
L. REV. 107, 114 n.15 (1982) (collecting cases where Justice Black “sustain[ed] many laws
believed to be unconstitutional . . . even by more conservative colleagues not sharing his
‘absolute’ commitment to the first amendment”). The use of categorical exclusions to a
categorical rule is not limited to the First Amendment, though.  For example, in Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), the Court created a categorical rule
that compensation is required under the Takings Clause only where all economically bene-
ficial use of land has been denied. Id. at 1019.  In dissent, Justice Stevens—himself an
advocate of balancing—wrote that “[l]ike many bright-line rules, the categorical rule estab-
lished in this case is only ‘categorical’ for a page or two in the U.S. Reports” before admit-
ting of an exception. Id. at 1067.
24 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 519 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see
also Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, supra note 8, at 1424 (identifying
Frankfurter as “chief spokesman” of balancing approach).
25 341 U.S. 494.
26 Sullivan, supra note 15, at 294 n.3.  Laurent Frantz traces the lineage of the balancing
cases to Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939), a case involving restrictions on hand-
bills, in which the Court held that “the delicate and difficult task falls upon the courts to
weigh the circumstances and to appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in sup-
port of the regulation of the free enjoyment of the rights,” id. at 161.  Frantz, The First
Amendment in the Balance, supra note 8, at 1425.
27 Dennis, 341 U.S. at 519 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).  The plurality opinion in which
Frankfurter was concurring seemed to adopt the balancing approach espoused by Chief
Judge Learned Hand in the court of appeals opinion below:  “In each case [courts] must
ask whether the gravity of the ‘evil,’ discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion
of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.” Id. at 510 (plurality opinion) (quoting
United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950)); see Van Alstyne, supra note 23,
at 124 (providing graphic representation of this test).
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cess, than by announcing dogmas too inflexible for the non-
Euclidian problems to be solved.28
Frankfurter, in other words, preferred to consider competing interests
in the context of each individual case.
The echoes of this debate can still be heard throughout First
Amendment law.  Justice Frankfurter’s voice generally drowns out
Justice Black’s, as balancing has largely displaced categorization as the
preferred mode of First Amendment protection.29  But the fact that
balancing tests generally prevail in First Amendment analysis does not
mean that Justice Black fought entirely in vain.  Indeed, various forms
of categoricalism—if not the kind of categorical absolutism that
Justice Black advocated—apply throughout First Amendment doc-
trine, often in tandem with balancing.  Such is the case with the com-
mercial speech test described in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.
v. Public Service Commission,30 which prescribes balancing by permit-
ting restrictions that directly further a substantial government objec-
tive and reach no further than necessary to accomplish that objective31
but also categorically denies coverage to commercial speech that is
false or misleading.32
In order to shed light on the complicated relationship between
categoricalism and balancing, the following Subsections consider the
use of categorical analysis at three different levels33 of First
28 Dennis, 341 U.S. at 524–25 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
29 See Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 779
(2001) (“Contemporary First Amendment opinions . . . are loaded with the rhetoric of
balancing . . . .”). See generally Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test That Ate Everything:  Interme-
diate Scrutiny in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783, 785, 825
(arguing that intermediate scrutiny has effectively become “some sort of default standard”
in Supreme Court such that “[b]alancing . . . may be inevitable” in First Amendment juris-
prudence).
30 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
31 Id. at 564; see also Metromedia v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 507 (1981)
(applying Central Hudson).
32 See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563–66 (holding that because First Amendment pro-
tected commercial speech for its informational value, misleading commercial messages are
not protected).
33 Pierre Schlag’s slightly different approach to rules and standards essentially elimi-
nates the second level, which I call classification:
[T]here are two sets of oppositions that constitute the rules v. standards
dichotomy:  The trigger can be either empirical or evaluative, and the response
can be either determined or guided.  The paradigm example of a rule has a
hard empirical trigger and a hard determinate response. . . . A standard, by
contrast, has a soft evaluative trigger and a soft modulated response.
Schlag, supra note 13, at 382–83.  I part ways with this approach for a few reasons, not least
of which is the prevalence of hard triggers that result in soft modulated responses and soft
triggers that lead to hard modulated responses.  For example, the Eighth Amendment cate-
gorically forbids (hard response) the imposition of “cruel and unusual” punishments (soft
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Amendment analysis:  First, in determining coverage—whether a
speech act implicates the First Amendment at all; second, in deter-
mining classification—whether the act falls into a subcategory like
commercial speech or expressive conduct that may be entitled to
intermediate protection (usually through balancing); and, finally, in
defining protection—whether and for what purpose the government
may ban or burden the covered act.34
1. Categorization as Coverage
The first stage at which categoricalism operates in free speech
cases is in the initial determination of whether a speech act is covered
at all by the First Amendment.  If an act is not covered, it by defini-
tion lacks constitutional protection.  Thus, as Frederick Schauer notes,
“questions about the involvement of the First Amendment in the first
instance are often far more consequential than are the issues sur-
rounding the strength of protection that the First Amendment affords
the speech to which it applies.”35
Total categorical coverage may be particularly unattractive to
those who are committed to total categorical protection because the
combination of categorical coverage and protection would lead to
equal and absolute protection for all speech acts, including libel,36
obscenity,37 child pornography,38 and the like.  The Justices often
tinker with coverage as a means of zoning out such unsavory results.39
trigger), and the Fifth Amendment requires “just compensation” (soft response) for any
taking (hard trigger).
34 This three-part structure is adapted from Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First
Amendment:  A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265 (1981).  As is always the case
with adaptations, it preserves the structure of the original and reflects the director’s grati-
tude to its author, while attempting to offer a new interpretive gloss.
35 Schauer, supra note 20, at 1767.
36 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (“Like insurrection, con-
tempt, advocacy of unlawful acts, breach of the peace, obscenity, solicitation of legal busi-
ness, and the various other formulae for the repression of expression that have been
challenged . . . libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations.  It
must be measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment.” (footnotes omitted));
see also Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952) (holding that protection of “lib-
erty” under Fourteenth Amendment did not prevent state from punishing criminal libel).
37 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (finding that obscene material is not
protected speech under First Amendment).
38 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765 (1982) (finding that child pornography is
not protected speech and upholding statute prohibiting persons from distributing material
depicting sexual performance by child under age of sixteen). But see Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 256 (2002) (declining to extend categorical exclusion of child
pornography to cover virtual child pornography).
39 See Kenneth L. Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 SUP. CT.
REV. 75, 78–79 (“A favorite judicial technique [of absolutists] has been to define one’s
absolute so that its protective scope does not cover the interests before the Court.”).
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Even Justice Black, the devoted absolutist, was relatively flexible
about the ways in which he drew the borders around “speech,”40 and
the Court has generally followed his lead.  Fraud and crime-facilitating
speech, for example, are thought to be entirely outside the bounds of
the Amendment, and no balancing is required to suppress them in a
given case.41
But importantly, the boundaries of these categorical exclusions
may be a result of balancing.42  Indeed, even scholars and judges who
avowedly oppose balancing as a mode of protection seem sanguine
about using it to define (and limit) coverage.43  Obscenity, for
example, has been “[t]he most notorious of the First Amendment’s
visibly contested boundary disputes.”44  And in Miller v. California,45
the Court clearly stated that obscenity falls outside the First
Amendment’s protection:  “This much has been categorically settled
by the Court, that obscene material is unprotected by the First
Amendment.”46  But the scope of this exclusion is itself defined
through a kind of balancing test that relies on a conception of the First
Amendment’s central values:  Speech is obscene under Miller if it
appeals to the “prurient interest,” is patently offensive, and has no
40 See supra note 23 (noting cases describing Justice Black’s categorical approach).
41 See, e.g., Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., 538 U.S. 600, 612 (2003)
(“[T]he First Amendment does not shield fraud.”); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.,
336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949) (“It rarely has been suggested that the constitutional freedom for
speech and press extends its immunity to speech or writing used as an integral part of
conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute.”); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204,
206 (1919) (affirming conspiracy conviction and noting that First Amendment, “while
prohibiting legislation against free speech as such[,] cannot have been, and obviously was
not, intended to give immunity for every possible use of language” (citing Robertson v.
Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897))); see also Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57
STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1103 (2005) (“Surprisingly, the Supreme Court has never squarely
confronted this issue [of when crime-facilitating speech should be constitutionally unpro-
tected], and lower courts and commentators have only recently begun to seriously face it.”
(footnotes omitted)).
42 See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932,
959–60 (1919) (“The true boundary line of the First Amendment can be fixed only when
Congress and the courts realize that the principle on which speech is classified as lawful or
unlawful involves the balancing . . . of two very important social interests, in public safety
and in the search for truth.”). See generally Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge
the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180,
1192–93 (1970) (describing “definitional balancing” approach).
43 See Frantz, Is the First Amendment Law?, supra note 8, at 731–32 (“Nor am I dis-
cussing whether the judge should examine the pros and cons before defining the scope of a
constitutional guarantee.”).
44 Schauer, supra note 20, at 1774.
45 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
46 Id. at 23 (emphasis added); see also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483, 485
(1957) (holding that, despite “unconditional phrasing of the First Amendment,” “obscenity
is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press”).
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serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.47  Similarly, in
Brandenburg v. Ohio48 the Court apparently engaged in some kind of
interest-weighing when it concluded that the First Amendment allows
the government to proscribe advocacy that is “directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action.”49 And in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,50 the Court
invoked balancing to justify its refusal to extend the categorical exclu-
sion of child pornography to cover virtual child pornography:
“Without a significantly stronger, more direct connection, the
Government may not prohibit speech on the ground that it may
encourage pedophiles to engage in illegal conduct.”51
As the Third Circuit recently recognized in declining to identify
depictions of animal cruelty as a “new category of speech that is
unprotected by the First Amendment,”52 the “common theme” among
these categories of excluded speech “is that the speech at issue consti-
tutes a grave threat to human beings or, in the case of obscenity,
appeals to the prurient interest.”53  In other words, the First
Amendment’s categorical coverage rules were derived not directly
from the text of the First Amendment, nor necessarily by tracing the
lineal descendants of some “original” categories, but by weighing con-
temporary interests in light of the Amendment’s core values.
47 Miller, 413 U.S. at 24; see also Roth, 354 U.S. at 487 (defining “obscene material” as
“material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest”).
48 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
49 Id. at 447.  Whether Brandenburg is a true balancing test is a somewhat tricky ques-
tion.  As John Hart Ely notes, “[t]here is in Brandenburg no talk of balancing.”  John Hart
Ely, Flag Desecration:  A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First
Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1491 (1975).  And yet Brandenburg has
often been characterized as a kind of weighted balancing test. See, e.g., Randall P.
Bezanson & Gilbert Cranberg, Institutional Reckless Disregard for Truth in Public Defama-
tion Actions Against the Press, 90 IOWA L. REV. 887, 913 (2005) (arguing that
“Brandenburg stakes out the strong version of” a “multipart balancing” involving “an
assessment of the harm, the likelihood of the harm, and the intent of the speaker”).  Per-
haps the best explanation is that “[t]he Brandenburg decision effectively overruled the
balancing approaches utilized in Schenck and Dennis.  However, the Brandenburg stan-
dard was itself derived using a balancing approach that highly values political speech, and
even in its application it requires a calculated judgment to determine the immediacy, likeli-
hood, and seriousness of the harm.”  Wilson R. Huhn, Assessing the Constitutionality of
Laws That Are Both Content-Based and Content-Neutral:  The Emerging Constitutional
Calculus, 79 IND. L.J. 801, 856 (2004); see also Helen Norton, You Can’t Ask (or Say) That:
The First Amendment and Civil Rights Restrictions on Decisionmaker Speech, 11 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 727, 760 n.141 (2003) (“Brandenburg might be viewed as the outcome
of a balancing analysis.”).
50 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
51 Id. at 253–54.
52 United States v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218, 220 (3d Cir. 2008).
53 Id. at 224.
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2. Categorization as Classification (Subcategorization)
Even if a particular speech act is covered by the First
Amendment, it may be classified into one of the many subcategories
of free speech,54 each of which receives a different level of protection.
Many of these levels of protection are akin to balancing,55 and thus it
is at this stage that categorization and balancing most commonly
interact:  The division between types of speech is categorical, but the
levels of protection are often variants of balancing.
A robust system of classification typically develops only over
time, as courts come to recognize classes of cases—such as expressive
conduct, commercial speech, or certain speech fora—that are similar
enough to be grouped together.  Drawing these lines is rarely an easy
task.  It is not always clear, for example, whether a public forum is
“limited.”56  The boundaries of commercial speech, too, are incredibly
ill defined.57  And because classification employs different tests and
contemplates a multiplicity of subcategories (rather than the simple,
binary, in-or-out results of the coverage inquiry), it almost inevitably
yields overlapping and nonexclusive subcategories.  For example, gov-
ernment speech is defined largely by speaker identity (government or
not), commercial speech is defined not by speaker identity but by con-
tent, and forum analysis begins by asking where (either physically or
54 Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV.
1256, 1256 (2005) (“Subdivision is part and parcel of any body of law, and wisely creating
the subdivisions is as central to First Amendment doctrine as it is to torts, contracts,
agency, antitrust, securities regulation, and of course much, much else.”).
55 See Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249,
1275 (1995) (noting that courts have not been able to develop uniform and cohesive frame-
work for First Amendment analyses, as there are numerous social contexts that tests must
address); see also Frantz, Is the First Amendment Law?, supra note 8, at 731 (“Suggestions
that ad hoc balancing is appropriate only for a particular class of cases appear in the
opinions.”).
56 Justice Souter, similarly to Justice Kennedy, has argued that “[p]ublic forum analysis
is stultified . . . by treating its archetypes as closed categories.”  Int’l Soc’y for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 710 (1992) (Souter, J., dissenting); accord id. at
693–94 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Our public forum doctrine ought not to be a jurispru-
dence of categories rather than ideas or convert what was once an analysis protective of
expression into one which grants the government authority to restrict speech by fiat.”).
57 For Frederick Schauer, “[c]ommercial speech is also a category relatively easy both
to identify and to describe,” Schauer, supra note 34, at 291, but I confess great personal
confusion on the matter. See Joseph Blocher, School Naming Rights and the First
Amendment’s Perfect Storm, 96 GEO. L.J. 1, 32–33 (2007) (noting Supreme Court’s recita-
tion of various descriptions and indicia of commercial speech but lack of precise and com-
prehensive definition).  My confusion seems to be widely shared. See generally, e.g., Nat
Stern, In Defense of the Imprecise Definition of Commercial Speech, 58 MD. L. REV. 55
(1999) (acknowledging and defending imprecise definition of commercial speech in
Supreme Court jurisprudence).
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metaphorically58) a particular speech act is made.59  “Quite obviously,
. . . a particular speech act may in fact cut across these artificial lines,
readily embarrassing an attempt to say which kind of speech it was.”60
Just as the subcategories blend into one another, so too do the
various tests that apply within them.  Instead of the rigid two-tier
approach that is associated most closely with the Warren Court61 and
around which free speech doctrine has long been “almost obsessively
organized,”62 the Court has applied “intermediate scrutiny” to a
growing list of these First Amendment subcategories.63  Indeed,
various forms of intermediate scrutiny—dubbed the “Test That Ate
Everything” by one First Amendment scholar64—apply to nearly all of
58 See Rosenberger v. Rector of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995) (“The [stu-
dent activities fund] is a forum more in a metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic
sense, but the same principles are applicable.”).
59 Blocher, supra note 57, at 50–51 (describing problem of overlapping and conflicting
subcategories).
60 Van Alstyne, supra note 23, at 141.  For my own “embarrassing . . . attempt,” see
Blocher, supra note 57. See also Schauer, supra note 34, at 307 (“The risk of misapplica-
tion of numerous subcategories leads us to eschew subcategories within the first amend-
ment, avoiding them even when a distinction seems justifiable.”).
61 See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword:  In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:  A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (noting that “[t]he Warren Court embraced a rigid two-tier attitude” in
equal protection cases).  The disintegration of the tiers of scrutiny is not limited to First
Amendment cases, but extensive discussion of the broader trend is beyond the scope of
this Article. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96
YALE L.J. 943, 968 (1987) (noting, more than twenty years ago, that “[t]he two-tiered
approach . . . is cracking, and a sliding-scale balancing approach may be slowly emerging”);
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1336 (2007) (“With
the ghost of Lochner no longer quite so frightening, the Court now eschews the relatively
rigid discipline of a two-tiered scheme of strict scrutiny and minimal rational basis review
that it once found attractive.”); Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term—
Foreword:  Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 77 (1996) (arguing that “[t]he
hard edges” of tiered review have “softened, and there has been at least a modest conver-
gence away from tiers and toward general balancing of relevant interests”); see also
Bhagwat, supra note 29, at 787 (“The final step in the codification of tiered review in free
speech cases was the adoption of the formal standards of review developed in the equal
protection arena—that is, rational basis review and strict scrutiny—into the edifice of First
Amendment law.”).
62 Rubenfeld, supra note 29, at 785.
63 Intermediate scrutiny appears to have arisen in equal protection cases involving
gender distinctions. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (holding that classifica-
tion by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially
related to achievement of those objectives in order to withstand Fourteenth Amendment
challenge).  However it has since migrated to many other areas of constitutional law. See
Bhagwat, supra note 29, at 784 (describing growth of intermediate scrutiny in First
Amendment as paralleling Fourteenth Amendment sex discrimination doctrine).
64 See Bhagwat, supra note 29, at 783 (dubbing intermediate scrutiny as such in title of
article).
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the First Amendment’s major subcategories,65 from commercial
speech66 to expressive conduct67 to time, place, and manner restric-
tions.68  Although the precise contours of intermediate scrutiny theo-
retically vary among subcategories, they have in some cases collapsed
on top of one another.69  In any event, intermediate scrutiny in all of
its forms represents “an overtly balancing mode”70—perhaps “the
only genuine balancing mode that we have.”71
3. Categorization as Protection
Finally, categorization and balancing differ in the protection they
extend to speech acts.  Under a balancing approach, a speech act may
be banned when the government’s interests (however weighted) out-
weigh those of the speaker (again, however weighted).72  If a speech
act is entitled to categorical protection, however, the government may
not ban—and may not even be able to burden—it.
Because Justice Black essentially lost his battle for First
Amendment categoricalism, very few speech acts—even covered
ones—enjoy absolute categorical protection.  As Schauer says, “It is
at this stage that we can no longer escape facing up to the recurrent
65 See id. at 810–16 (discussing, inter alia, regulations of mass media, speech of govern-
ment employees, regulation of sexually oriented businesses, and charitable solicitation); see
also Rubenfeld, supra note 29, at 779 (“Contemporary First Amendment opinions, espe-
cially in their development of strict scrutiny and other, intermediate levels of review, are
loaded with the rhetoric of balancing.”).
66 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)
(applying modified form of intermediate scrutiny to restrictions on commercial speech).
67 See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (holding that government
regulation of expressive conduct is justified “if it is within the constitutional power of the
Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the govern-
mental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than [necessary]”).
68 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 803 (1989) (allowing content-
neutral regulations on speech so long as they serve important government objective, are
narrowly tailored, and preserve ample alternative means of communication).
69 See Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989) (noting that commercial speech test
and time, place, and manner test are “substantially similar”); Moser v. FCC, 46 F.3d 970,
973 (9th Cir. 1995) (describing tests as “essentially identical”).
70 Sullivan, supra note 15, at 297.
71 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Governmental Interests and Unconstitutional Conditions Law:
A Case Study in Categorization and Balancing, 55 ALB. L. REV. 605, 606 (1992).
72 See Fried, supra note 20, at 763 (noting that balancing can be short-circuited where
Court “cast[s] the controversy in a form which conceals the conflict to be resolved, as it
does whenever it inflates one part of the balance while leaving the other highly particular”
(citing, inter alia, Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 134 (1954))); see also Frantz,
The First Amendment in the Balance, supra note 8, at 1440 (“[I]t is conceivable that a court
might apply the balancing test [in First Amendment cases], yet attach so high a value to
freedom of speech that the balance would nearly always be struck in its favor.”).
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question of ad hoc balancing.”73  But “while the government may reg-
ulate some aspects of private speech (such as its time, place, and
manner), the inviolable rule of the First Amendment is that viewpoint
discrimination is prohibited.”74  This is true, at least doctrinally, no
matter how important the interests asserted by the government.  As
Justice Kennedy has noted, “raw censorship based on content” is “for-
bidden by the text of the First Amendment,”75 leaving no room for
justification.  This categorical ban on viewpoint discrimination can be
restated as a categorical rule protecting viewpoints.  As discussed in
more detail in the following Subsection, the Court’s categorical rule
against viewpoint discrimination suggests that viewpoints are them-
selves central to core First Amendment values.
4. The Role of Values in Determining First Amendment Categories
As even this brief description indicates, First Amendment doc-
trine is a complicated and occasionally illegible map of sometimes-
overlapping categories, which are joined and in many areas simply
painted over by balancing approaches.  But at all three levels of anal-
ysis described above, First Amendment categoricalism tracks—albeit
imperfectly—deeply embedded free speech values.
At the first two levels (coverage and subcategorization), the
Court often has denied coverage to certain categories of “speech” or
given varying levels of protection to certain speech subcategories
depending on their proximity to the apparent core values of the First
Amendment,76 such as the protection of political viewpoints and the
promotion of democracy.77  In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,78 for
73 Schauer, supra note 34, at 296; see also Sullivan, supra note 15, at 296 n.9 (“Interme-
diate scrutiny . . . is a balancing mode, whether adopted officially, or de facto.” (citing
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (officially); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (de facto))).
74 Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech:  When Speech Is Both Private and Govern-
mental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 613–14 (2008); see also id. at 614 n.33 (“[A]bove all else,
the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because
of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” (quoting Police Dep’t v. Mosley,
408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972))).
75 Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105, 128 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
76 For purposes of this discussion, I hold aside the possibility that the core value of the
First Amendment is some speaker-focused value like the protection of autonomy or self-
actualization.  Viewing the First Amendment through one of these lenses would undoubt-
edly change the resulting categorical analysis.
77 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (“The constitutional
guarantees require . . . a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering dam-
ages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the
statement was made with ‘actual malice’. . . .”); see also Harry Kalven Jr., The New York
Times Case:  A Note on “The Central Meaning of the First Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT.
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example, the Court noted that categories of unprotected speech such
as obscenity and fighting words “are no essential part of any exposi-
tion of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that
any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by
the social interest in order and morality.”79  This is a balancing
method (“outweighed”) but a categorical result (exclusion from cov-
erage), and it is informed by First Amendment values (the value of
the “exposition of ideas” and the “social value as a step to truth”).
Conversely, and invoking the same First Amendment values, the
Court has found that commercial speech is covered by the
Amendment because it is not so far removed “from any exposition of
ideas, and from truth, science, morality, and arts in general, in its dif-
fusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of Government, that
it lacks all protection.”80  Because commercial speech is not immedi-
ately proximate to these core values, it receives less protection than
political speech and other subcategories closer to the core.81
With regard to coverage, the Court’s treatment of “incidental
burdens” on fundamental rights confirms the central importance of
constitutional values in categorical analysis.82  Under a balancing
approach, incidental burdens are treated the same as any other
burden but are constitutional almost by definition, since an “inci-
dental” burden is likely to be outweighed by even a moderate govern-
mental interest.  Under a categorical approach to protection, however,
incidental burdens are as impermissible as any other burden and
cannot be balanced away.  This can lead to absurd results, such as the
REV. 191, 204–10 (suggesting Sullivan represented return to focus on rejection of seditious
libel and of government’s ability to censor critical speech).
78 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
79 Id. at 572.
80 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762
(1976) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572).
81 See Rubenfeld, supra note 29, at 801 (doubting proposition, but noting that “[a] lot
of scholarly and judicial language suggests that ‘political speech’ is the true core of the First
Amendment and that words moving away from this core are entitled to proportionately
less constitutional protection”).
82 Here I mean burdens that are “incidental” to the right in the sense that they are
peripheral and do not burden the core of the right, rather than burdens that are incidental
in the sense that they are unintended side effects of a regulation.  For an illuminating dis-
cussion of whether incidental burdens should be analyzed in the same way as any other
burden, see Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 1175, 1179, 1181 (1996), arguing that even “incidental burdens [should] be treated as
real infringements of rights” and that a “substantiality threshold ought to apply to inci-
dental and facilitative direct burdens, but not to purposeful ones.” See also Margaret Jane
Radin, Presumptive Positivism and Trivial Cases, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 823, 837
(1991) (“[R]ules both work better in trivial cases and last longer in trivial domains.”).
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invalidation of popularly enacted laws that present a minor and unin-
tended obstacle to the exercise of a categorically protected right.83
The Court, of course, may attempt to avoid such results by treating
incidental or other infringements as categorical exceptions, as it has
with the exclusionary rule.84  But in order to determine whether bur-
dens are only “incidental” to the core of the right, the Court must first
identify that core.
Thus the identification of core values enables courts to accord
lessened protection to covered subcategories that are not proximate to
those values (a question of subcategorization) and to transform inci-
dental burdens into categorical exclusions (an issue of coverage).  At
the other end of the spectrum, this approach also allows courts to
create areas of absolute categorical protection.  Viewpoints, for
example, are categorically protected85 in keeping with the general pre-
sumption that a central purpose of the First Amendment—perhaps the
central purpose—is to prevent the government from discriminating
against them.86
One way to build such categorical protections on a foundation of
constitutional principle is by identifying the government’s purpose in
burdening a right.  Where that purpose runs counter to the purpose of
the right, the burden is flatly unconstitutional, no matter how the bal-
ance would otherwise be struck.87  Jed Rubenfeld has argued for an
increased focus on such “purposivism” in First Amendment cases,88
and others have suggested that it already underlies much modern free
83 Cf. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 581
(1983) (striking down facially discriminatory “special tax that applies only to certain publi-
cations protected by the First Amendment” but noting that “[i]t is beyond dispute that the
States and the Federal Government can subject newspapers to generally applicable eco-
nomic regulations without creating constitutional problems”).
84 See infra notes 292–97 and accompanying text (discussing creation of categorical
exceptions in exclusionary rule doctrine).
85 Corbin, supra note 74, at 613, 614 & n.33.
86 Id.; see also Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (“It is the purpose
of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will
ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it
be by the Government itself or a private licensee.”); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) (arguing that compelled speech “invades the sphere of intellect
and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve
from all official control”).
87 See generally Srikanth Srinivasan, Incidental Restrictions of Speech and the First
Amendment:  A Motive-Based Rationalization of the Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence, 12
CONST. COMMENT. 401 (1995) (arguing that Court’s incidental speech restriction cases
reflect its effort to identify improper governmental motive).
88 See generally Rubenfeld, supra note 29 (contending that purposivist interpretation of
First Amendment will eliminate balancing test currently in doctrine and shift focus from
actor’s purpose in breaking law to state’s purpose in enacting law).
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speech doctrine.89  Rubenfeld further connects purposivism to cat-
egoricalism, arguing that “[t]he purpose of purposivism is to reclaim
an old idea:  that there are certain First Amendment absolutes, which
stand up regardless of any balancing of interests.”90
But one cannot reclaim the idea of First Amendment absolutism
without first discovering another idea:  what value the First
Amendment protects.91  In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,92 for example,
Justice Scalia wrote for the Court that just because a city may ban
obscenity does not mean that it may ban “only those legally obscene
works that contain criticism of the city government.”93  This would
reflect an impermissible government purpose:  the suppression of
political dissent.  But the rule in R.A.V. in effect gives protection to a
category of speech—obscene works—that is otherwise not covered
by the First Amendment.  Regardless of whether this rule is correct,
it is only justifiable if explained by reference to background First
Amendment values—the purpose not just of the challenged govern-
ment regulation but of the First Amendment itself, which, as
described by the R.A.V. Court, is the protection of political dissent.
Interestingly, once impermissible government purposes have been
identified by reference to constitutional values, the creation of consti-
tutional categories can be justified not only through purposivist cat-
egoricalism but through balancing.  That is, if illegitimate government
purposes are simply given no weight on the scale, then in any bal-
ancing evaluation the scale will tip in favor of the individual every
time, no matter how slight her interest.  The result is a categorical
protection.94
89 See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose:  The Role of Governmental
Motive in First Amendment Doctrine , 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 414 (1996)
(“[N]otwithstanding the Court’s protestations in O’Brien, . . . First Amendment law, as
developed by the Supreme Court over the past several decades, has as its primary, though
unstated, object the discovery of improper governmental motives.”); Post, supra note 55, at
1256 (“[A] close analysis of these cases indicates that they almost invariably turn on judi-
cial scrutiny of the purposes served by the regulation at issue.”).
90 Rubenfeld, supra note 29, at 770; see also id. at 779 (“A purposivist view of the First
Amendment does not involve balancing.  It is absolute.  It does not purport to determine if
the constitutional ‘costs’ in a given case are ‘outweighed’ or ‘justified’ by the governmental
‘benefits.’”).
91 See id. at 787 (disclaiming attempt “to answer the ‘big why’”).
92 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
93 Id. at 384; see also id. (“Such a simplistic, all-or-nothing-at-all approach to First
Amendment protection is at odds with common sense and with our jurisprudence as
well.”); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (holding that speech act of flag burning,
which expresses criticism of government, is protected by First Amendment and cannot be
criminalized).
94 This assumes, of course, that the individual has a legitimate interest to assert.  If one
believes—as this zero-weight balancing explanation would suggest—that obscenity is cate-
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This blending of categorical and balancing approaches is repre-
sentative of First Amendment doctrine more generally.  Rather than
fully embracing categorization or balancing at all levels of analysis,
First Amendment doctrine generally combines the two, for example
by using balancing or other standard-like tests to establish the borders
of constitutional coverage and then applying categorical rules to
speech in certain subcategories.  Obscenity is perhaps the most
notable example of a category whose blurry borders95 seem to be
drawn using balancing96 but whose level of protection (none) is more
clear.97  Conversely, other areas of the First Amendment are sur-
rounded by easily defined boundaries but are governed by blurry bal-
ancing standards.  The time, place, and manner test, for example,
applies to a broad and relatively well-defined area of speech restric-
tions but utilizes a balancing-style approach.98
Thus, even within the confines of the First Amendment, the rela-
tionship between categorization and balancing is extraordinarily com-
plex, and one is often used to moderate the other.  This may be due in
part to the fact that neither courts nor scholars have identified a
single, overriding core First Amendment value.99  Indeed, it seems
gorically excluded from First Amendment coverage because individuals have no legitimate
interest in it, then the R.A.V. situation would involve weighing nothing against nothing.
The result of this weighing would probably favor the speaker:  “Where the First
Amendment is implicated, the tie goes to the speaker, not the censor.”  FEC v. Wis. Right
to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2669 (2007).
95 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (declining to
define in detail obscenity and stating:  “[P]erhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly
doing so.  But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not
that.”).
96 See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957) (defining “obscene material” as
“material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest”); see also David
L. Faigman, Madisonian Balancing:  A Theory of Constitutional Adjudication, 88 NW. U. L.
REV. 641, 677–78 (1994) (“The quintessential instance of definitional balancing in the First
Amendment involves state regulation of obscene materials. . . . [I]t is the government inter-
ests themselves that led the Court to define speech so as to not encompass obscenity.”).
97 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (defining obscenity as outside boundaries
of First Amendment).  Cases in which the government restricts speech in its capacity as a
“manager”—for example in content-neutral regulation of a limited public forum—receive
similar treatment, ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS 234–40 (1995), as do cases
in which the government itself is speaking. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421–23
(2006) (denying First Amendment protection to statements made by public employee pur-
suant to his official duties); Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005)
(exempting government speech from First Amendment scrutiny).  Presumably a similar
rule allowing regulation will arise in Second Amendment cases where government
employees assert the right to bear arms in connection with their jobs.
98 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 803 (1989) (allowing content-
neutral regulations on speech so long as they serve important objective, are narrowly tai-
lored, and preserve ample alternative means of communication).
99 Compare ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM:  THE CONSTITUTIONAL
POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 70–75 (1965) (arguing that central purpose of free speech is to
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that the messiest and most incoherent areas of doctrine—obscenity
and commercial speech among them—are those in which the under-
lying values are the most contested.100  The point here is only that the
Court’s use of categoricalism in First Amendment doctrine correlates,
at least roughly, with the core values of the Amendment upon which
the Justices have from time to time agreed.  Where those embedded
core values are implicated, as in the context of viewpoint discrimina-
tion or political speech,101 categoricalism provides relatively clear, cer-
tain, and justifiable rules.  Where they are not, or are unclear,
balancing tests provide adjudicators with more flexibility.
In sum, First Amendment doctrine employs a categorical
approach frequently at the level of coverage, occasionally at the level
of subcategorization, and rarely—and usually only by reference to the
core values of the Amendment—at the level of protection.  At every
level, however, categoricalism relies on some conception of the First
Amendment’s core values.  Those values may be contested, and the
lines between categories correspondingly uncertain, but the doctrine
itself seems roughly dependent on underlying principles.
In Heller, the Court had an opportunity to revisit all three levels
of categorical analysis and to identify the core principles of the Second
Amendment.  It also had an opportunity, in doing so, to draw on the
lessons—both good and bad—of the First Amendment by creating
categories based on embedded constitutional values.  The following
Part describes the Court’s failure to do so.
II
HELLER’S CATEGORICALISM AND THE GHOST OF
JUSTICE BLACK
The first Section of this Part describes the close-but-troubled rela-
tionship between the First and Second Amendments and explains how
old battles over First Amendment protection reverberate in current
promote democracy), with Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
591, 594 (1982) (arguing that one central purpose of free speech is self-realization).
100 See, e.g., Bret Boyce, Obscenity and Community Standards, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 299,
345 (2008) (“The difficulty with a national standard is that a national community of values
regarding obscenity scarcely exists.”).
101 See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 793 (2002) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (“The political speech of candidates is at the heart of the First Amendment,
and direct restrictions on the content of candidate speech are simply beyond the power of
government to impose.”); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318 (1988) (noting that regulation
“operates at the core of the First Amendment by prohibiting petitioners from engaging in
classically political speech”); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (“Whatever differ-
ences may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically uni-
versal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free
discussion of governmental affairs.”).
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discussions of the Second.  The second Section explores the debate
between Justices Scalia and Breyer in Heller, which echoes the terms,
theories, and significance of the debate between Justices Black and
Frankfurter over the meaning of the First Amendment.  The third Sec-
tion then describes the triumph of the categorical approach in Heller,
what it ultimately may mean for Second Amendment doctrine, and
what—if anything—it indicates about the core values of the Second
Amendment.
A. The Relationship Between the First and Second Amendments
Until Heller, the Second Amendment debate focused almost
exclusively on whether the Amendment protects an “individual” right
to gun ownership unconnected to any actual or potential militia ser-
vice.  To call the literature on this issue voluminous would be a gross
understatement,102 and it is far beyond the scope of this Article to
assess it.  For present purposes, the relevant point is simply that
scholars, litigants, and courts often have presumed that the First and
Second Amendments are closely and meaningfully related.103  Even as
the constitutional and popular debates shift from the “individual”
nature of the Second Amendment right to the more meaningful dis-
cussion of the scope of that right, First Amendment doctrine and
scholarship probably will continue to be a standard reference point for
courts struggling to craft constitutional rules governing the right cre-
ated in Heller.104  Indeed, arguments from the individual rights debate
102 The reader doubtless expects to see here a lengthy “See, e.g.” footnote demon-
strating, by its length, the size of the literature.  I have omitted such a footnote for fear
that—unless it were allowed to crowd out the rest of the Article—it would understate the
amount of ink that has been spilled on the topic.  Instead, I refer interested readers to an
online bibliography cataloguing much of the literature, David B. Kopel, Comprehensive
Bibliography of the Second Amendment in Law Reviews (Nov. 26, 2002), http://
www.saf.org/AllLawReviews.html.
103 See, e.g., Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 398 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“But just
as the First Amendment free speech clause covers modern communication devices
unknown to the founding generation, . . . the Second Amendment protects the possession
of the modern-day equivalents of the colonial pistol.”); David G. Browne, Treating the Pen
and the Sword as Constitutional Equals:  How and Why the Supreme Court Should Apply
Its First Amendment Expertise to the Great Second Amendment Debate, 44 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 2287, 2289 (2003) (arguing that Second Amendment is naturally compared to
First); George A. Mocsary, Explaining Away the Obvious:  The Infeasibility of Character-
izing the Second Amendment as a Nonindividual Right, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2113, 2171
(2008) (same); Randy E. Barnett, Was the Right To Keep and Bear Arms Conditioned on
Service in an Organized Militia?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 237, 271 (2004) (book review) (same).
104 Whether this connection is justifiable is a more complicated question.  I do not mean
to endorse it as a normative matter, only to recognize it as a descriptive, and therefore
doctrinally relevant, one.
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already have begun to be transposed into the question of the appli-
cable standard of review.105
The comparison is doubtless attractive for supporters of broad
gun rights because of the vaunted place that the First Amendment
holds in constitutional law and popular discourse.  As Schauer notes,
the “First Amendment not only attracts attention, but also strikes fear
in the hearts of many who do not want to be seen as opposing the
freedoms it enshrines.”106 Thus:
[L]awyers representing clients with claims and causes not necessa-
rily lying within the First Amendment’s traditional concerns have
reason to add First Amendment arguments to their core claims, or
to modify their core claims to connect them with First Amendment
arguments, in the hope that doing so will increase the probability of
success.107
In linking the First and Second Amendments, scholars have also
connected the dissent-promoting values of each, suggesting that
they—apparently more than other amendments—are focused on
empowering individuals to resist government oppression.108  For
example, it has been argued that, because the Second Amendment—
like the First—is designed to protect dissent, gun-registration require-
ments and the assault-weapons ban are unconstitutional.109  This dis-
sent-focused, functionalist account is distinguishable from the leading
alternative explanations:  self-defense for the Second Amendment,
self-actualization for the First.110
105 See, e.g., Gary E. Barnett, The Reasonable Regulation of the Right To Keep and Bear
Arms, 6 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1152102 (reviewing Heller and applying First Amendment time, place, and
manner doctrine to Second Amendment).
106 Schauer, supra note 20, at 1790.  This may be due in large part to the fact that the
First Amendment protects freedoms that are especially near and dear to scholars, lawyers,
and judges, who traffic in speech. Id. at 1793; see also R.H. Coase, Advertising and Free
Speech, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1977) (arguing that academics overvalue free speech and
undervalue free markets).
107 Schauer, supra note 20, at 1795.
108 See David B. Kopel, Trust the People:  The Case Against Gun Control, 109 POL’Y
ANALYSIS 1, 25 (1988) (“The Supreme Court has ruled that the First Amendment prohibits
the government from registering purchasers of newspapers and magazines, even of foreign
Communist propaganda.  The same principle should apply to the Second Amendment:  the
tools of political dissent should be privately owned and unregistered.”); Nelson Lund, The
Past and Future of the Individual’s Right to Arms, 31 GA. L. REV. 1, 71 (1996) (“This does
not imply, however, that courts should uphold the [assault-weapons ban].  As the Supreme
Court has recognized in the analogous area of the First Amendment, leaving legislatures
free to engage in whimsical infringements on fundamental rights prepares the way for
more serious assaults on individual liberty.”).
109 See supra note 108.
110 As to the latter, gun advocates might also argue that gun ownership has some kind of
expressive value and is therefore no different from flag burning (or waving).  But here,
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Gun-rights supporters also can point to the apparent textual simi-
larities between the two Amendments, particularly their unqualified
admonitions that the rights they protect “shall not” be infringed or
abridged.  In this respect, the First Amendment “is exceptionally crisp
and unambiguous.”111  Not every amendment has language lending
itself to such rule-like application, and the text of some amendments
all but demands balancing.112  The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition
on “unreasonable” searches and seizures is a prime example of text
that calls for balancing, as Justice Scalia has recognized,113 as is the
prohibition on “excessive” bails and fines.114  The Second
Amendment, however, at least arguably has language that is as precise
and absolutist as the First.115
Of course, “[d]espite the simplicity and logical force of a literal
interpretation of the first amendment, it has never commanded a
majority of the Supreme Court.”116  As the Court noted in declaring
obscenity to be “outside the protection intended for speech and
rather than using one amendment to cast light on the other, this essentially would invoke—
simultaneously—Second Amendment and expressive conduct claims.
111 Van Alstyne, supra note 23, at 110.
112 Schlag, supra note 13, at 391 n.27 (“The textualist position with regard to interpreta-
tion is not without irony:  [M]uch of the text of the Constitution reads (literally) like stan-
dards.”).  However, in his famous exchange with Laurent Frantz, Wallace Mendelson
argued that the “highly ambiguous” language of the First Amendment supported the
Court’s use of balancing in free speech cases.  Mendelson, supra note 8, at 821.
113 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995) (Scalia, J.) (“As the text of
the Fourth Amendment indicates, the ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a gov-
ernmental search is ‘reasonableness.’”); see also Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 527
(1984) (“Determining whether an expectation of privacy is ‘legitimate’ or ‘reasonable’ nec-
essarily entails a balancing of interests.”).
114 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.  Other examples include the Sixth Amendment’s guar-
antee of a “speedy” trial, and the Fifth Amendment’s requirement of “just” compensation
for a taking. See Van Alstyne, supra note 23, at 110 (noting that Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth
Amendments are ambiguous and equivocal, containing “adjectives that are not self-
defining” whose “necessary referents . . . lie outside the words of the Constitution”).
115 Because the Supreme Court so clearly rejected it, I do not address here the argument
that the first half of the Second Amendment—unlike the language of the First—identifies
the purpose of the right the Amendment protects.  William Van Alstyne argues:
[T]he first amendment differs from the second amendment in this respect.  The
first amendment does not link the protection it provides with any particular
objective and may, accordingly, be deemed to operate without regard to
anyone’s view of how well the speech it protects may or may not serve such an
objective.  The second amendment expressly links the protection it provides
with a stated objective (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free state”) and might, therefore, be deemed to operate only
insofar as the right it protects (“the right of the people to keep and bear
arms”) can be shown to be connected with that objective.
Van Alstyne, supra note 23, at 112 n.13.
116 Id. at 113.
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press,”117 “it is apparent that the unconditional phrasing of the First
Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance.”118  As
described in Part I, free speech doctrine has been pockmarked with
categorical exclusions and stretched and trimmed with balancing tests,
and so the textual similarities between the First and Second
Amendments are not enough to show that gun ownership should
receive the kind of absolute protection that some gun-rights advocates
may favor.  Nevertheless, First Amendment doctrine is comfortingly
familiar, and courts almost certainly will continue to rely on it—
probably explicitly so—as they attempt to address the seemingly par-
allel problems arising under the Second Amendment.  For example,
forum analysis may prove just as relevant for the Second Amendment
as it has for the First.  Indeed, both before and after Heller, gun
owners have asserted a broad constitutional right to gun possession in
the kinds of public and semipublic119 places that led to seminal cases
in First Amendment law, such as malls,120 airports,121 post offices,122
and schools.123
117 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957).
118 Id. at 482–83.
119 See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946) (discussing speech in company-
owned town and stating that “[t]he more an owner, for his own advantage, opens up his
property for use by the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by
the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it”).
120 See PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 76–77 (1980) (considering right
of private shopping mall to exclude speakers); Doug Patton, Mall Signs Might as Well Read
‘Please Shoot Me,’ HUM. EVENTS, Dec. 11, 2007, http://www.humanevents.com/
article.php?id=23900 (criticizing designation of schools, shopping malls, and U.S. post
offices as “gun-free” zones because it may lead to increased violence by designating them
as soft targets).
121 See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 680 (1992)
(determining that airports are nonpublic fora for First Amendment purposes); John
Sullivan, Airport’s Ban on Guns Is Disputed in Atlanta, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2008, at A12
(discussing post-Heller challenge by GeorgiaCarry.org to Atlanta airport’s ban on guns).
122 See United States v. Dorosan, No. 08-042, 2008 WL 2622996, at *6 (E.D. La. June 30,
2008) (rejecting Second Amendment claim arising from possession at post office, as “Con-
gress has the authority to regulate safety of the post office and its property, notwith-
standing the individual right to bear arms in the home, where the need for defense of self,
family and property is most acute” (internal quotation marks omitted)). See generally
Anuj C. Desai, The Transformation of Statutes into Constitutional Law:  How Early Post
Office Policy Shaped Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 671 (2007) (dis-
cussing relationship between post office and First Amendment).
123 See Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513–14 (1969) (holding that
teachers and students may exercise First Amendment rights within schools as long as con-
duct does not create substantial disruption and does not impinge on rights of others); Stu-
dents for Concealed Carry on Campus, http://concealedcampus.org (last visited July 11,
2008) (arguing for expanded gun rights at schools).  In addition to addressing these doc-
trinal problems, scholars may find fertile ground for more theoretical comparison between
the Amendments.  To take just one obvious example, the debate over the “individual” or
“collective” nature of the Second Amendment, see supra note 2 and sources cited, may
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Categoricalism and First Amendment doctrine were therefore
central to Heller long before it reached the Supreme Court.  Indeed,
the use of categorization in the court of appeals’ decision124 is what
drew the United States into the case as an amicus opposing that deci-
sion, notwithstanding the Bush Administration’s support for the
court’s almost-unprecedented125 determination that the Second
Amendment protects an individual right to gun ownership uncon-
nected to any actual or potential militia service.  In addition to recog-
nizing an “individual” right, the court of appeals created a categorical
rule to govern it:  “Once it is determined—as we have done—that
handguns are ‘Arms’ referred to in the Second Amendment, it is not
open to the District to ban them.”126  The Solicitor General agreed
with the court of appeals that “the Second Amendment protects an
individual right to possess firearms unrelated to militia operations”127
but nonetheless argued that laws burdening the right should be sub-
ject to a form of “heightened scrutiny”128 instead of the court of
appeals’ “more categorical approach.”129  The Solicitor General’s pro-
already have a rough analogue in First Amendment theory. See, e.g., Robert Post,
Meiklejohn’s Mistake:  Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public Discourse, 64 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1115–23 (1993) (advancing autonomy-based account of First
Amendment and criticizing “collectivist” theories that focus on specific goals of public dis-
course).  With regard to such theories, my inclination toward an institutional view of the
First Amendment compels me to note also the pathbreaking work of Frederick Schauer
(and the lesser contributions of others). See Schauer, supra note 54 (arguing for First
Amendment jurisprudence that takes institutional contexts into account); see also Joseph
Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 821, 828 (2008) (arguing
that “Institutional First Amendment” approach should also take into account economic
understandings of marketplace of ideas).
124 Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 394–401 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
125 The only federal court to reach a similar conclusion was the Fifth Circuit, in United
States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001).  The Fifth Circuit found that “the Second
Amendment protects the right of individuals to privately keep and bear their own firearms
that are suitable as individual, personal weapons and are not of the general kind or type
excluded by Miller, regardless of whether the particular individual is then actually a
member of a militia.” Id. at 264 (referencing United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, (1939)).
Nonetheless, the court held that “the predicate order in question here is sufficient, albeit
likely minimally so, to support the deprivation, while it remains in effect, of the defen-
dant’s Second Amendment rights.” Id. at 265.
126 Parker, 478 F.3d at 400.  Perhaps foreshadowing what is to come, elsewhere the
majority apparently countenanced the possibility of First Amendment time, place, and
manner restrictions. Id. at 399 (“The protections of the Second Amendment are subject to
the same sort of reasonable restrictions that have been recognized as limiting, for instance,
the First Amendment.” (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989))).
127 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 7, District of Columbia v. Heller, 128
S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (No. 07-290), 2008 WL 157201.
128 Id. at 8.
129 Id. at 9.
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posed two-tiered standard of review—cribbed from voting rights cases
like Burdick v. Takushi130—was unmistakably a balancing test.131
Weaving together these threads of categoricalism and First
Amendment analysis at oral argument, Chief Justice Roberts
previewed the Court’s eventual approach:
Well, these various phrases under the different standards that are
proposed, “compelling interest,” “significant interest,” “narrowly
tailored,” none of them appear in the Constitution; and I wonder
why in this case we have to articulate an all-encompassing standard.
. . . I mean, these standards that apply in the First Amendment just
kind of developed over the years as sort of baggage that the First
Amendment picked up.  But I don’t know why when we are starting
afresh, we would try to articulate a whole standard that would apply
in every case?132
By creating a new individual Second Amendment right disconnected
from any military service, the Court was in some sense “starting
afresh.”  It was not without guidance, however, in creating a frame-
work of review to govern the new right.  Every state court to consider
the question had settled on a standard of “reasonableness,”133 and
scholars had endorsed similar levels of scrutiny.134  But as Chief
Justice Roberts’s question suggested, the Court’s decision in Heller
turned not on levels of scrutiny but on the difference between cat-
egoricalism and balancing.
B. Categoricalism and Balancing in Heller
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Heller is, in essence, what
Justice Black might have written if Heller had been a First
Amendment case.  It is beyond the scope of this Article to evaluate in
any depth the historical and textual analysis underlying the majority’s
130 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (describing “flexible” approach that would “weigh the char-
acter and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the [First
Amendment] against the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the
burden . . . taking into consideration the extent to which those interests make it necessary
to burden the plaintiff’s rights” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
131 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 127, at 9.
132 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 44.
133 See Brief for Petitioners at 40–59, District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783
(2008) (No. 07-290), 2008 WL 102223 (arguing that District’s gun control laws are “reason-
able” regulations and noting state courts that have upheld “reasonable” regulations over
state constitutional challenges); see also Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second
Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683, 686–87 (2007) (noting that state courts apply reasona-
bleness standard rather than strict scrutiny review).
134 See, e.g., Calvin Massey, Guns, Extremists, and the Constitution, 57 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1095, 1133 (2000) (arguing for “semi-strict” scrutiny); Winkler, supra note 133, at 686
(“[T]he Second Amendment[ ] . . . is appropriately governed by a deferential, reasonable-
ness review . . . .”).
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conclusion that the Second Amendment protects an “individual” right
to bear arms for “confrontation.”135  The goal of the present analysis
instead is to evaluate the soundness of the majority’s categorical
approach and to identify some of the difficult questions it leaves
unanswered.
1. The Majority’s Categorical Approach
From its central holding, which extends broad protection to the
“individual” right to bear arms unconnected from militia service, to its
flat exclusions of felons, the mentally ill, and certain “Arms” from
constitutional coverage, the majority opinion in Heller was categorical
in its approach.  And in keeping with its originalist tone, the majority
justified its categories as being compelled by the text and original
understanding of the Second Amendment.  This kind of originalist
categoricalism—which the majority compares (wrongly, it would
seem136) to First Amendment categoricalism—neither requires nor
permits any balancing beyond that accomplished by the Framers
themselves:
The First Amendment contains the freedom-of-speech guarantee
that the people ratified, which included exceptions for obscenity,
libel, and disclosure of state secrets, but not for the expression of
extremely unpopular and wrong-headed views.  The Second
Amendment is no different.  Like the First, it is the very product of
an interest-balancing by the people—which Justice Breyer would
now conduct for them anew.137
The majority emphasized that “[c]onstitutional rights are enshrined
with the scope they were understood to have when the people
adopted them, whether or not future legislatures or (yes) even future
judges think that scope too broad.”138  Somewhat ironically, however,
this approach to constitutional coverage cannot even explain the First
Amendment examples the majority itself invoked.  For while it is true
that some First Amendment exceptions have been justified in
originalist terms,139 many (if not most) of its categorical exceptions—
135 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2797.
136 See supra Part I (describing predominance of balancing in First Amendment
doctrine).
137 See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2821.
138 Id.
139 See, e.g., Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919) (“We venture to
believe that neither Hamilton nor Madison, nor any other competent person then or later,
ever supposed that to make criminal the counseling of a murder . . . would be an unconsti-
tutional interference with free speech.”); see also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 571–72 (1942) (“There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech,
the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any constitu-
tional problem.” (emphasis added)).
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including obscenity—are either created or defined by judicial bal-
ancing.140  More fundamentally, as explained above in Section I.B,
First Amendment doctrine for the most part has rejected categori-
calism in favor of balancing tests and intermediate scrutiny.
Although the majority did not countenance balancing, it did hint
at the possibility of constitutional gun control regulations.  Again, the
analysis built on First Amendment categoricalism:
Of course the right was not unlimited, just as the First
Amendment’s right of free speech was not.  Thus, we do not read
the Second Amendment to protect the right of citizens to carry arms
for any sort of confrontation, just as we do not read the First
Amendment to protect the right of citizens to speak for any
purpose.141
This passage is notable both for what it says and what it does not.  It
does not allow for “reasonable regulation” of gun ownership—the
weighted balancing test adopted by all the state courts that have
addressed the question under their parallel constitutional provi-
sions.142  Rather, the majority’s reference to the First Amendment
suggests an effort to temper the scope of a categorical test by creating
categorical exceptions—just as Justice Black did.
Of all the First Amendment cases the majority could have cited
for the basic proposition that the right to free speech is not unlimited,
the fact that it turned to United States v. Williams143 may be particu-
140 See supra notes 42–53, 76–87 and accompanying text (discussing examples of cate-
gorical exclusions created by balancing in First Amendment doctrine).
141 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2799 (citing United States v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 1830 (2008)).
The majority’s comparison of “any sort of confrontation” to “speak[ing] for any purpose”
is interesting.  It would seem that most First Amendment categorical exclusions are based
not on the “purpose” of a speech act but on its “sort” or manner.  This is reflected in the
requirement that time, place, and manner restrictions be content neutral. See, e.g., Ark.
Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677–78 (1998) (holding that government
may impose time, place, and manner regulations “as long as the restrictions are reasonable
and [are] not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the
speaker’s view” (alteration in original) (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ.
Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985))).
142 Winkler, supra note 133, at 687, 716–18; see also Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2853 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (citing Winkler for proposition that state “[c]ourts that do have experience in
these matters have uniformly taken an approach that treats empirically-based legislative
judgment with a degree of deference”). But see Wilkinson, supra note 3, at 47 (“Heller
(like Roe) has given birth to a balancing test that will force courts into the conscious
weighing of competing factors as they decide which state interests are sufficiently strong
and which regulations unduly burden the new right.” (internal quotation marks omitted)
(referencing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973))).  I disagree with Judge Wilkinson on this
point not because I think Second Amendment doctrine will eschew balancing—I think that
such balancing is inevitable as courts grapple with the scope of the right, see infra Part
III.A—but because I think that Heller itself forbids it.
143 128 S. Ct. 1830 (2008).
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larly telling.  In Williams—also authored by Justice Scalia—the Court
rejected a First Amendment challenge to a statute criminalizing pan-
dering in child pornography.  Because it was rendered just a month
before Heller, Williams may have been a particularly handy reference
point.  But it was also a categorical decision, based on the fact that
child pornography is a “category of proscribable speech.”144  By
endorsing the Williams approach, the majority signaled its preference
for a categorical approach to both Amendments.
As if confirming its allegiance to categoricalism, the majority in
Heller disclaimed any Second Amendment version of the First
Amendment’s time, place, and manner test:  “It is no answer to say, as
petitioners do, that it is permissible to ban the possession of handguns
so long as the possession of other firearms (i.e., long guns) is
allowed.”145  Justice Breyer’s dissent, in contrast, would have
imported some of the “ample alternatives” inquiry that often has been
used to justify speech regulations:146  “In weighing needs and burdens,
we must take account of the possibility that there are reasonable, but
less restrictive alternatives.  Are there other potential measures that
might similarly promote the same goals while imposing lesser restric-
tions?”147  Justice Breyer concluded, “Here I see none.”148
In a short passage near the end of its opinion, the majority also
suggested the possibility of constitutional gun control but again
avoided endorsing a balancing approach.  Post-Heller cases have
relied on this passage in rejecting Second Amendment challenges
144 Id. at 1836.
145 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2818.  The court of appeals made a nearly identical ruling:
The District contends that since it only bans one type of firearm, “residents still
have access to hundreds more,” and thus its prohibition does not implicate the
Second Amendment because it does not threaten total disarmament.  We think
that argument frivolous.  It could be similarly contended that all firearms may
be banned so long as sabers were permitted.
Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 400 (D.C. Cir. 2007). The First Amendment’s
time, place, and manner test usually turns on the availability of other channels of commu-
nication. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 803 (1989) (permitting
content-neutral regulations on speech so long as they serve important government objec-
tive, are narrowly tailored, and preserve ample alternative means of communication); see
also Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294 (1984) (upholding prohi-
bition on camping in park as permissible time, place, and manner restriction). But see
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 53–54 (1986) (upholding zoning ordinance
against adult theaters even though few, if any, reasonable alternative sites were available).
146 See supra note 145 (explaining how ample alternative means of communication is
factor in permitting content-neutral regulations on speech in First Amendment context).
147 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2864 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
148 Id.
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from felons and others,149 and indeed it seems to be the closest the
majority came to a roadmap for constitutional gun regulation:
Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not
unlimited.  From Blackstone through the 19th-century cases, com-
mentators and courts routinely explained that the right was not a
right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner
whatsoever and for whatever purpose. . . . Although we do not
undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of
the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken to
cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of fire-
arms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying
of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government
buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the
commercial sale of arms.150
The Court further clarified:  “We identify these presumptively lawful
regulatory measures only as examples; our list does not purport to be
exhaustive.”151
But acknowledging that the right is “not unlimited” did not
commit the majority to a balancing approach any more so than Justice
Black’s recognition that the First Amendment had a limited “scope”
prevented him from supporting absolute protection for whatever fell
within that scope.152  Instead, the majority followed Justice Black’s
lead by preserving a categorical rule while carving out categorical
exceptions.  The justifications, if any,153 for these categorical exclu-
sions are discussed in more detail in Subsection II.C.1.
The majority also attempted—as Heller had154—to carve out a
categorical exception for safe storage laws:  “Nor, correspondingly,
149 See, e.g., United States v. Gilbert, 286 F. App’x 383, 386 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Under
Heller, individuals still do not have the right to possess machineguns or short-barreled
rifles, as Gilbert did, and convicted felons, such as Gilbert, do not have the right to possess
any firearms.”); United States v. Harden, No. 06-79-KI, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54717, at *2
(D. Or. July 16, 2008) (finding that challenge to felon-in-possession statute “goes well
beyond the holding in Heller” and “declin[ing] to extend the case to that extent”); Johnson
v. United States, No. 1:07CV155 HEA, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51148, at *14 (E.D. Mo. July
2, 2008) (citing same passage and finding that Heller “completely foreclosed” Johnson’s
challenge to felon-in-possession law).
150 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816–17 (citations omitted).
151 Id. at 2817 n.26.
152 See Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 874–75 (1960) (“[O]ne
of the primary purposes of the Constitution with its amendments was to withdraw from the
Government all power to act in certain areas—whatever the scope of those areas may be.”
(emphasis added)).
153 See Wilkinson, supra note 3, at 23 (“The Heller majority seems to want to have its
cake and eat it too—to recognize a right to bear arms without having to deal with any of
the more unpleasant consequences of such a right.”).
154 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 72 (“Whatever standard of [re]view we
may wish to apply, I think, would encompass a safe storage provision.”); Respondent’s
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does our analysis suggest the invalidity of laws regulating the storage
of firearms to prevent accidents.”155  The Court’s efforts to create this
exception, however, demonstrated the weakness and instability of the
categoricalism it employed—a categoricalism purportedly based
directly on original understanding.  After disclaiming any intent to
suggest the invalidity of safe storage requirements, the majority pro-
ceeded to do exactly that, holding unconstitutional the District’s
trigger lock law, which required guns to be kept “unloaded and dis-
sembled or bound by a trigger lock or similar device.”156  The Court
struck down the law on the basis that it contained no explicit concep-
tion for self-defense.  The District—joined by the Solicitor General on
this point157—argued that the Court should not create a potential con-
stitutional infirmity by reading the law to prohibit self-defense but
instead simply should acknowledge the same kind of common law
self-defense exception that applies to other criminal prohibitions, such
as assault and murder, which also lack explicit self-defense
exceptions.158
The Court declined to do so, finding that the language of the
statute required guns to be locked even in emergency situations.  This
“ma[de] it impossible for citizens to use them for the core lawful pur-
pose of self-defense and [was] hence unconstitutional.”159  In support
of this conclusion, though, the majority’s originalist categoricalism
took an odd turn, because there were undoubtedly Founding-era
restrictions that would have prevented, in effect, the use of weapons in
self-defense and that, like the District’s regulation, contained no
explicit self-defense exception.  While it would not recognize a self-
defense exception to the District’s law, the majority was able to find
Brief at 54, Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (No. 07-290), 2008 WL 336304 (“Respondent would not
quarrel with a true ‘safe storage’ law, properly crafted to address Petitioners’ stated
concerns.”).
155 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2820.
156 D.C. CODE ANN. § 7-2507.02 (LexisNexis 2001), invalidated by District of Columbia
v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
157 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 127, at 31.
158 See, e.g., Hernandez v. United States, 853 A.2d 202, 205–07 (D.C. 2004) (reversing
conviction for aggravated assault where trial court failed to instruct jury on right of self-
defense); MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (1962) (discussing, as defense to criminal liability,
justifiable use of force in self-protection); see also United States v. Panter, 688 F.2d 268,
272 (5th Cir. 1982) (“We hold today that where a convicted felon, reacting out of a reason-
able fear for the life or safety of himself, in the actual, physical course of a conflict that he
did not provoke, takes temporary possession of a firearm for the purpose or in the course
of defending himself, he is not guilty of violating [law prohibiting possession of firearms by
convicted felons].”).
159 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2818.
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categorical self-defense exceptions to these Founding-era
restrictions.160
The majority then suggested that it was the amount of prescribed
punishment that distinguished the District’s law from its historical
predecessors:
[Said predecessors were] akin to modern penalties for minor public-
safety infractions like speeding or jaywalking. . . . [W]e do not think
that a law imposing a 5-shilling fine and forfeiture of the gun would
have prevented a person in the founding era from using a gun to
protect himself or his family from violence, or that if he did so the
law would be enforced against him.  The District law, by contrast,
far from imposing a minor fine, threatens citizens with a year in
160 Thus a Massachusetts law that “forbade the residents of Boston to ‘take into’ or
‘receive into’ ‘any Dwelling House, Stable, Barn, Out-house, Ware-house, Store, Shop or
other Building’ loaded firearms, and permitted the seizure of any loaded firearms that
‘shall be found’ there,” did not actually bar the use of weapons in self-defense, because
there is “reason to doubt that colonial Boston authorities would have enforced that general
prohibition against someone who temporarily loaded a firearm to confront an intruder
(despite the law’s application in that case).” Id. at 2819 (citing Act of Mar. 1, 1783, ch. 13,
1783 Mass. Acts 218); see also id. at 2820 (citing Act of May 28, 1746, ch. X, Acts and Laws
of Mass. Bay 208) (claiming that it is “implausible” that another of Boston’s laws “would
have been enforced against a citizen acting in self-defense”).  Although Pennsylvania had a
law restricting the firing of guns at certain times and places, “it is unlikely that this law
(which in any event amounted to at most a licensing regime) would have been enforced
against a person who used firearms for self-defense” because, according to the majority,
Justice Wilson, an authority on Pennsylvania, recognized that “the right to self-defense
with arms was protected by the Pennsylvania Constitution.” Id. at 2820 (citing Act of Aug.
26, 1721, ch. 245, § 4, 3 Pa. Stat. at Large 253–54).  By contrast, the District of Columbia’s
recognition of the right to self-defense, the lack of evidence that the District had ever
prosecuted anyone for unlocking a weapon to use in self-defense, and the District’s repre-
sentations that it had no intent to pursue such prosecutions in the future did not give the
majority “reason to doubt” that the District would do so anyway.  Brief for Petitioners,
supra note 133, at 56. Justice Breyer noted in dissent, “I am puzzled by the majority’s
unwillingness to adopt a similar approach.  It readily reads unspoken self-defense excep-
tions into every colonial law, but it refuses to accept the District’s concession that this law
has one.” Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2853–54 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
The fact that Heller was a facial challenge should have made the lack of evidence on
this point particularly notable.  To prevail on such a challenge, “[t]he challenger must
establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.”  United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) (upholding constitutionality of Bail Reform Act
of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–50 (Supp. III 1982), against claims that portions of Act allowing
pretrial detention of dangerous suspects violated substantive due process).  Where burdens
are speculative—as they arguably were in Heller—such attacks generally fail. See id. (“A
facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount
successfully . . . .”); cf. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1615,
1621–24 (2008) (finding insufficient evidence of burden to support facial attack on Indiana
voter identification requirement since, “seeking relief that petitioners have advanced a
broad attack on the constitutionality of the [state statute, plaintiff] bear[s] a heavy burden
of persuasion”).  The District currently is considering legislation that would explicitly allow
guns to be kept in their homes, loaded and unlocked, for “immediate self-defense.”  Nikita
Stewart, Gun Bill Provides for Self-Defense, WASH. POST, July 1, 2008, at B1.
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prison (five years for a second violation) for even obtaining a gun in
the first place.161
But the Court’s analysis on this point was fundamentally flawed:  It
compared Founding-era penalties for violating safe-storage laws to
contemporary penalties for unlawful possession rather than for viola-
tions of the trigger-lock requirement (a modern safe-storage require-
ment).  And even assuming that the Court’s comparison is legitimate,
it seems unlikely that the remote prospect of punishment, even a
prison term, would deter a modern homeowner from unlocking his
gun “to protect himself or his family from violence”162 any more than
it would deter a homeowner in the eighteenth century.
More importantly, as discussed in more detail in Section II.C, the
majority’s analysis demonstrated the limits of its own originalist-
categoricalist approach.  Without identifying some constitutional
value, that approach cannot reasonably—or at least did not in
Heller—justify the creation of modern constitutional categories
simply by labeling them the descendants of Framing-era forebears.163
2. Justice Breyer’s Balancing Alternative
Justice Breyer began his dissent with the straightforward,
Frankfurter-like assessment that the majority’s categorical approach
was “wrong” because “the protection the Amendment provides is not
absolute.”164  Even assuming that the majority was correct that the
161 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2820–21 (citing D.C. CODE ANN. § 7-2507.06 (LexisNexis 2001)).
162 Id. It would be possible, of course, to argue that trigger locks are impermissible
because, as a practical matter, they make it impossible to defend one’s self against an
intruder. See Parker v. District of Columbia, No. 04-7041, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 22872, at
*5 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 25, 2007) (per curiam) (noting that if Supreme Court took certiorari, it
“would necessarily be obliged to consider the impact of Section 7-2507.02 [on the constitu-
tionality of the Act as a whole], since a disassembly or trigger lock requirement might
render a shotgun or rifle virtually useless to face an unexpected threat”).  But this is
emphatically not the basis for the result in Heller.  Aside from a short discussion at oral
argument, Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 82–84, neither party made men-
tion of the practical difficulties occasioned by trigger locks.  I will not discuss them at
length here.  For more on trigger locks generally, including a description of federal, state,
and local laws on locking devices, see LEGAL CMTY. AGAINST VIOLENCE, REGULATING
GUNS IN AMERICA 223–30 (2008), http://www.lcav.org/library/reports_analyses/
regulating_guns.asp. See generally Andrew J. McClurg, Child Access Prevention Laws:  A
Common Sense Approach to Gun Control, 18 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 47 (1999) (dis-
cussing efficacy of Child Access Prevention laws, of which trigger locks are often important
element).
163 See infra notes 192–94 and accompanying text.
164 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2847 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2848 (“I shall not
assume that the Amendment contains a specific untouchable right to keep guns in the
house to shoot burglars.  The majority . . . does not, because it cannot, convincingly show
that the Second Amendment seeks to maintain [such a right] in pristine, unregulated
form.”); id. at 2870 (“In my view, there simply is no untouchable constitutional right guar-
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Second Amendment right is not militia related but rather protects a
right to bear arms for “confrontation,” self-defense, or something else
entirely,165 Justice Breyer argued that the proper way to evaluate bur-
dens on that right would be to balance the government’s interests
against the interests of an individual in exercising the right.  “The ulti-
mate question” under his approach would be “whether the statute
imposes burdens that, when viewed in light of the statute’s legitimate
objectives, are disproportionate.”166  In identifying the purpose of the
regulation and acknowledging its historical forebears, Justice Breyer
determined that “a legislature could reasonably conclude that the law
will advance goals of great public importance, namely, saving lives,
preventing injury, and reducing crime.”167  Justice Breyer’s inquiry
included elements of purposivism, historical analysis, reasonableness,
and deference to legislative judgment.  But its discussion of goals, bur-
dens, and tailoring was unmistakably the language of balancing.
Having described his balancing test, Justice Breyer—citing “First
Amendment cases applying intermediate scrutiny”168—proceeded to
canvass the “empirically based arguments” presented by Heller and
his amici.169  Justice Breyer noted that “the question here is whether
[those arguments] are strong enough to destroy judicial confidence in
the reasonableness of a legislature that rejects them.”170  He observed
that urban areas “have different experiences with gun-related death,
injury, and crime, than do less densely populated rural areas”171 and
that “the linkage of handguns to firearms deaths and injuries appears
to be much stronger in urban than in rural areas.”172  He recognized—
indeed, emphasized—that the special dangers of urban gun violence
were not on the minds of the Framers when they drafted the Second
Amendment.173  But rather than focusing on the content of Founding-
era regulations, as the majority purported to do, Justice Breyer asked
anteed by the Second Amendment to keep loaded handguns in the house in crime-ridden
urban areas.”).
165 Id. at 2793 (majority opinion); see also id. at 2796 (arguing that “bear arms” means
“simply the carrying of arms”).
166 Id. at 2854 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
167 Id. at 2847; see also id. at 2847–48 (describing law at issue in Heller as being tailored
to unique needs of urban areas and as imposing burden upon gun owners “that seems
proportionately no greater than restrictions in existence at the time the Second
Amendment was adopted”).
168 Id. at 2860 (borrowing test of “substantial evidence” of reasonable inferences drawn
by legislature).
169 Id. at 2859.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 2857.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 2866 (“[A]ny self-defense interest at the time of the Framing could not have
focused exclusively upon urban-crime related dangers.”).
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whether, in light of the deference to which it was entitled,174 the
District’s legislature had struck a reasonable balance.  He concluded it
had.175
C. Categoricalism and Second Amendment Values
Justice Breyer framed his dissent with what he called a “process-
based” question, which actually involves the substance of the Second
Amendment right:  “How is a court to determine whether a particular
firearm regulation . . . is consistent with the Second Amendment?”176
Justice Breyer concluded that “[b]ecause [the majority’s decision] says
little about the standards used to evaluate regulatory decisions, it will
leave the Nation without clear standards for resolving those chal-
lenges.”177  In an effort to describe some of these future challenges
and identify the Second Amendment values relevant to their resolu-
tion, this Section returns to the three types of categorization employed
in First Amendment doctrine—coverage, classification, and protec-
tion—and analyzes their use in Heller.  It argues that the majority’s
attempt to create categories neither reflects nor enables a coherent
account of the Second Amendment’s core values, whatever they may
be.  It also argues that, although Heller clearly endorsed categori-
calism, Second Amendment doctrine will eventually become, like First
Amendment doctrine, a patchwork of balancing and categorical tests.
1. Second Amendment Coverage (Exclusions in Search of a
Justification)
Heller categorically excludes certain types of “people” and
“Arms” from Second Amendment coverage, denying them any consti-
tutional protection whatsoever. In this respect, its use of categorical
exclusions to trim the results of its categorical rule is reminiscent of
the speech exceptions endorsed by First Amendment categoricalists
like Justice Black.178  And just as those free speech exceptions have
been criticized as unprincipled (albeit expedient),179 it is difficult to
discern the principles or values behind Heller’s carve-outs.
174 See id. at 2860 (“[L]egislators, not judges, have primary responsibility for drawing
policy conclusions from empirical fact.  And, given that constitutional allocation of deci-
sionmaking responsibility, the empirical evidence presented here is sufficient to allow a
judge to reach a firm legal conclusion.”).
175 Id.
176 Id. at 2850–51.
177 Id. at 2868.
178 See supra notes 36–41 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Black’s willingness
to categorically exclude certain types of speech from First Amendment protection).
179 As William Van Alstyne has pointed out with regard to the First Amendment, it is
“verbal subterfuge” to say that “appropriately tailored” speech regulation does not
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The majority opinion specifically approved—for unstated rea-
sons180—the categorical exclusion of at least two groups of “the
people” from Second Amendment coverage:  “[N]othing in our
opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on
the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill.”181  The
Court’s approval of “prohibitions,” rather than regulations, confirms
that felons and the mentally ill, however defined, are excluded
entirely from Second Amendment coverage.  What is less clear, under
the majority’s reading of the Amendment, is why they should be.  The
exclusion of felons and the mentally ill seems contrary to the
majority’s all-inclusive reading of “the people,” which was the heart of
its textual interpretation of the Second Amendment’s “individual”
right.  Indeed, establishing that “the people” meant everyone was the
first step in the majority’s analysis of the Amendment’s “operative”
clause:  “[I]n all six other provisions of the Constitution that mention
‘the people,’ the term unambiguously refers to all members of the
political community, not an unspecified subset.”182  In other words, by
analyzing the lack of categorical exceptions in other constitutional
provisions that refer to “the people,” the majority concluded that the
Second Amendment, too, must extend to all citizens as “individuals.”
But as Justice Stevens pointed out in dissent, even felons and the men-
tally ill are people with rights under the other amendments the
majority identified, including the First.183  Perhaps Founding-era gun
laws prevented felons and the mentally ill from owning guns, and the
majority’s categorical exclusions are simply the modern analogues of
these (unidentified and perhaps nonexistent) historical exceptions.184
But because the values behind the categorical exclusion of felons in
Heller are opaque, and because the United States has a long history of
stringent gun control (particularly, it should be noted, against socially
infringe or abridge a constitutional right.  Van Alstyne, supra note 23, at 114; see also
Laurence H. Tribe, Toward a Metatheory of Free Speech, 10 SW. U. L. REV. 237, 242 (1978)
(lamenting “durability of the Orwellian ploy of reading obscenity out of the sphere of
protected expression by simply ‘defining’ it as form of nonspeech”).
180 See Wilkinson, supra note 3, at 22–23 (“[T]he Court does not explain why these
restrictions are embedded in the Second Amendment.”).
181 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816–17; see also id. at 2819 (“Before this Court petitioners have
stated that ‘if the handgun ban is struck down and respondent registers a handgun, he
could obtain a license, assuming he is not otherwise disqualified,’ by which they apparently
mean if he is not a felon and is not insane.”).
182 Id. at 2790–91.
183 Id. at 2827 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
184 Such a tradition-based analysis seems to apply in the First Amendment’s definition
of “public” forum. See Hague v. Comm. Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (“Wherever
the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the
use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, commu-
nicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.”).
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disfavored groups like African Americans185), it is unclear what other
categories of “the people” will find themselves outside the bounds of
the Second Amendment under this approach.  Equal protection doc-
trine might prevent some pernicious omissions, but the indetermina-
cies of equal protection law make this anything but clear.  Post-Heller
cases have already extended the list to include illegal aliens186 and
persons convicted of misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence.187
The majority encountered, but did not acknowledge, similar diffi-
culties when attempting to define the category of “Arms” covered by
the Second Amendment.  The court of appeals had classified “Arms”
by tracing the “lineal descendant[s] of . . . founding-era weapon[s]”
that are “in ‘common use’ today.”188 The Heller majority defined the
category slightly differently, holding that “the Second Amendment
185 See, e.g., STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, FREEDMEN, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, AND
THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS 1866–76 (1998) (contrasting intent of Fourteenth
Amendment’s framers that Second Amendment be incorporated against states to preserve
freedmen’s right to bear arms with race-based attempts by Southern states to limit black
gun ownership in Reconstruction era through “black codes” and with reluctance of judi-
ciary to incorporate); Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, “Never Intended To Be
Applied to the White Population”:  Firearms Regulation and Racial Disparity—The
Redeemed South’s Legacy to a National Jurisprudence?, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1307 (1995)
(examining relationship between race and gun ownership right in United States); Robert J.
Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment:  Toward an Afro-Americanist
Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309, 342–58 (1991) (discussing both importance of gun own-
ership to African Americans in Reconstruction Era and in 1960s and attempts by white
Southerners to limit gun ownership through state law).
186 United States v. Boffil-Rivera, No. 08-20437-CR-GRAHAM/TORRES, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 84633, at *21–22 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 12, 2008) (order denying motion to dismiss)
(“Clearly, under any historical interpretation of the enactment of the Second Amendment
or the interpretation of any similar right under the Constitution, the individual right to
bear arms defined by Heller does not apply to an illegal and unlawful alien.” (italics
omitted)); cf. Dearth v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 413, 414 (8th Cir. 2008) (considering challenge
to enforcement of provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 922 that prohibit non-residents of United
States from receiving or selling firearms for nonsporting purposes). See generally
Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Aliens with Guns:  Equal Protection, Federal Power, and the
Second Amendment, 92 IOWA L. REV. 891 (2007) (examining role of equal-protection and
federal-power principles in judicial analysis of alien gun laws).
187 One district court reasoned:
Based on the absence of a meaningful distinction between felons and persons
convicted of crimes of domestic violence as predictors of firearm violence, the
critical nature of the governmental interest, and the definitional tailoring of the
statute, the Court concludes that persons who have been convicted of a misde-
meanor crime of domestic violence must be added to the list of “felons and the
mentally ill” against whom the “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of
firearms” survive Second Amendment scrutiny.
United States v. Booker, 570 F. Supp. 2d 161, 164–65 (D. Me. 2008); see also United States
v. White, No. 07-00361-WS, 2008 WL 3211298, at *1 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 6, 2008) (upholding, in
wake of Heller, defendant’s conviction for possession of gun following conviction for mis-
demeanor crime of domestic violence).
188 Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 398 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
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extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms,
even those that were not in existence at the time of the founding.”189
But the “bearability” test carries (so to speak) its own complications.
For one thing, the extension of protection to all “bearable” arms
seems to conflict with Justice Scalia’s famous argument that, in identi-
fying the appropriate “level of generality” at which to evaluate histor-
ical tradition, the Court should “refer to the most specific level at
which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the
asserted right can be identified.”190  In evaluating the District’s
handgun ban, the “most specific level” of “historical tradition” could
not possibly have been “bearable” arms—the statute explicitly
allowed “bearable” weapons like shotguns and rifles.  The framework
for analysis instead should have been something along the lines of
handguns or pistols, rather than all bearable arms.  And if all “bear-
able” weapons are categorically protected, then small machine guns,
grenades, detonators, and other handheld weapons should also be
prima facie immune from bans, as they too may be carried and there-
fore “borne.”191
But having selected bearability as the relevant concept con-
necting modern weapons to their historical ancestors, the majority was
free to modify the court of appeals’ “lineal descendant” test and to
reject as “bordering on the frivolous” the suggestion (advanced by no
one) that “only those arms in existence in the eighteenth century are
protected by the Second Amendment.”192  In the majority’s words,
“We do not interpret constitutional rights that way,” as evidenced by
the fact that “the First Amendment protects modern forms of commu-
nications, and the Fourth Amendment applies to modern forms of
search.”193  This is true, of course, but it is not the end of the inquiry.
Explaining why the First Amendment protects modern forms of com-
munication requires the identification of some value that connects
those forms to their ancestors.  It is impossible, for example, to
explain why the First Amendment covers an eighteenth-century polit-
ical pamphlet and a twenty-first-century political blog but not an
obscene twenty-first-century nonpolitical pamphlet, without con-
necting those real-world categories to some constitutional value.  That
is, the preceding examples could be explained by the fact that the first
189 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2791–92 (2008).
190 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (Scalia, J., for the Court, joined
by Rehnquist, C.J.).
191 See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2793 (“At the time of the founding, as now, to ‘bear’ meant
to ‘carry.’”).
192 Id. at 2791.
193 Id. (citations omitted).
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two are means of communicating political ideas, a kind of expression
that is at the core of the First Amendment.194  Identifying that value
makes it clear that it is the political-ness that matters, not the pam-
phlet-ness.  The question in Heller, then, was not whether modern
handguns are connected to Founding-era weapons by some technolog-
ical link but rather whether they are connected by some meaningful
constitutional principle.  In other words, to what constitutional value
are Founding-era pistols and modern handguns both related?
In 1939, the Court employed just such a value-based approach in
attempting to define the category of constitutionally protected
“Arms” in United States v. Miller.195  In Miller, the Court rejected a
Second Amendment challenge brought by two men who had been
convicted of transporting an unregistered short-barreled shotgun in
interstate commerce.  The Court held:
In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or
use of a [short-barreled shotgun] at this time has some reasonable
relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated
militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the
right to keep and bear such an instrument.196
The Court continued:  “Certainly it is not within judicial notice that
this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its
use could contribute to the common defense.”197  Thus it appears that
the Court defined the category of protected “Arms” by reference to
the militia-related purpose of the Second Amendment.198
The Heller majority, however, emphatically rejected the reading
that the Second Amendment only protected military use of arms:
“Miller did not hold that and cannot possibly be read to have held
that.”199  Instead, the majority found that “Miller stands only for the
proposition that the Second Amendment right, whatever its nature,
extends only to certain types of weapons”200—namely, “arms that
‘have some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of
a well regulated militia.’”201  The majority and dissents therefore
194 See Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 52 (1982) (“At the core of the First Amendment
are certain basic conceptions about the manner in which political discussion in a represen-
tative democracy should proceed.”); see also supra Part I.B.4 (discussing how free speech
values determine which speech is at core of First Amendment protection).
195 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
196 Id. at 178.
197 Id.
198 See id. (“With obvious purpose to assure the continuation and render possible the
effectiveness of such forces the declaration and guarantee of the Second Amendment were
made.”).
199 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2814 (2008).
200 Id.
201 Id. (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939)).
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essentially agreed that the Amendment allowed restrictions based at
least on the type of weapons.  But, the majority continued, it “would
be a startling reading” of Miller to conclude that it protected military
equipment and nothing else.202  The majority instead seized on
another sentence later in Miller—“[o]rdinarily when called for
[militia] service [able-bodied] men were expected to appear bearing
arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at the
time”203—and concluded that the Second Amendment covers Arms
that are both “ordinary military equipment” and “in common use.”204
This is an interesting move for many reasons.  For one thing, it
suggests that the categorical exclusion of certain “Arms” from Second
Amendment coverage is justified by a different constitutional value
than the exclusion of certain “people.”  Weapons lose constitutional
coverage if they have no military use, but people are excluded
according to some completely different principle, or else felons would
have Second Amendment rights—they serve not just in the militias (at
least in the National Guard, perhaps the militias’ most direct descen-
dant) but in other armed forces as well.205  Additionally, the majority
suggested that the central question in determining whether a firearm
receives Second Amendment coverage is whether it is in “common
use.”  Indeed, it determined that handguns could not be banned
because they are “the most popular weapon chosen by Americans for
self-defense in the home.”206  Tying this popular preference back to
the Miller test, the majority concluded quite simply that the people’s
preferences—as evidenced by private gun ownership, not by the
actions of their popularly elected representatives207—are better
indicators of constitutional meaning than the lone precedent of Miller:
202 Id. at 2815.
203 Id. (quoting Miller, 307 U.S. at 179).
204 Id. at 2815–16.  Presumably neither Miller nor Heller meant for the phrase “at the
time” to limit the class of covered weapons to those in use “at the time” of the drafting of
the Second Amendment; rather, they meant it to denote any time when a person was
called for militia service.
205 See Michael Boucai, “Balancing Your Strengths Against Your Felonies”:  Considera-
tions for Military Recruitment of Ex-offenders, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 997, 1000–01 (2007)
(noting “military’s use of moral waivers to knowingly recruit thousands of persons with
criminal backgrounds each year”); Russell Carollo, Troubled Pasts Linked to Some Troops’
Crimes, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, NC), July 13, 2008, at A9 (noting existence of
National Guard felony waiver policy, which was suspended in December 2007 as result of
better recruiting).
206 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2818; see also id. (“It is enough to note, as we have observed,
that the American people have considered the handgun to be the quintessential self-
defense weapon.”).
207 Writing for the Court in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), Justice Scalia
stated that “the Framers had an eye toward politically charged cases like Raleigh’s—great
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As for the “hundreds of judges” who have relied on the view of the
Second Amendment Justice Stevens claims we endorsed in Miller:
If so, they overread Miller.  And their erroneous reliance upon an
uncontested and virtually unreasoned case cannot nullify the reli-
ance of millions of Americans (as our historical analysis has shown)
upon the true meaning of the right to keep and bear arms.208
Even if this statement were accurate—which is doubtful209—what rel-
evance it should have in the majority’s originalist categorical frame-
work is entirely unclear.  Basing categories on popular understanding
is living constitutionalism, plain and simple.210
As it had with the category of “people,” the majority simply
shaved off the disfavored results of categorical protection for firearms
by creating “another important limitation on the right to keep and
carry arms”:  “the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of
‘dangerous and unusual weapons.’”211  Although this limitation, too,
is probably in line with contemporary popular understanding of the
Second Amendment, it is difficult to justify based on a categorical
reading of the Amendment’s text or original understanding.  The
majority’s carve-out of “dangerous and unusual weapons” effectively
creates a rule that the government may not ban arms that it has not
state trials where the impartiality of even those at the highest levels of the judiciary might
not be so clear.” Id. at 68.
208 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2815 n.24 (citation omitted).
209 Justice Stevens objected strongly and persuasively to the notion that Americans have
relied on the majority’s understanding of the Amendment:
[I]t is hard to see how Americans have “relied,” in the usual sense of the word,
on the existence of a constitutional right that, until 2001, had been rejected by
every federal court to take up the question.  Rather, gun owners have “relied”
on the laws passed by democratically elected legislatures, which have generally
adopted only limited gun-control measures.  Indeed, reliance interests surely
cut the other way:  Even apart from the reliance of judges and legislators who
properly believed, until today, that the Second Amendment did not reach pos-
session of firearms for purely private activities, “millions of Americans,” have
relied on the power of government to protect their safety and well-being, and
that of their families.
Id. at 2844 n.38 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
210 See Posting of Jack Balkin to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/07/
is-heller-original-meaning-decision.html (July 2, 2008, 09:31 EST) (“Justice Scalia is well
known to despise the idea of living constitutionalism.  But what he has given us in Heller is
actually a living constitutionalist argument disguised as law office history.”); cf. Posner,
supra note 3, at 32, 33 (“[T]he Heller decision is exposed as an example of loose construc-
tion—despite the Court’s pretense of engaging in originalist interpretation . . . .”).
211 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817.  Post-Heller cases have construed this passage as creating a
categorical rule.  In Mullenix v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, for
example, a district court rejected the plaintiff’s arguments that regulation of machine guns
should be “limited to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions” and that “he may
accordingly own almost any type of weapon he chooses . . . so long as he complies with
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.”  No. 5:07-CV-154-D, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 51059 at *6–7 (E.D.N.C. July 2, 2008).
420 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:375
already banned, and as the dissent pointed out, “[t]here is no basis for
believing that the Framers intended such circular reasoning.”212  The
more likely explanation, it seems, is that Justice Scalia—the self-
described “faint-hearted originalist”213—is also a faint-hearted cat-
egoricalist.  This may be fine, or even desirable.  However, the carving
out of apparently absurd results not only raises questions about the
feasibility of categoricalism but also suggests the likelihood and cost
of line-drawing errors—after all, a category can be wrong without
quite being absurd.  The majority’s struggle to define coherent catego-
ries of “Arms” in Heller demonstrates the risk of error in creating
categories “out of whole cloth”214 without the benefit of prior
weighing—or even identification—of substantive constitutional
values, particularly in areas where federal judges are not experts.215
If Heller’s categoricalism is taken seriously, many of the most
important gun control battles will be fought not over the effectiveness
of gun control but over whether particular classes of “Arms” or
“people” are covered by the Second Amendment.  Of course, courts
may well employ balancing as a means of establishing these catego-
ries—finding, for example, that machine guns or felons are categori-
cally excluded from Second Amendment coverage because the
balance almost always will tip in favor of the government’s attempts to
regulate them.  As noted above, even Justice Black and other avowed
opponents of balancing as a mode of protection have been comfort-
able with the use of balancing to define coverage.216  The majority’s
acknowledgement of the possible exclusion of “dangerous and unu-
sual weapons”217 seems to provide just such an opportunity.
Naturally, however, Second Amendment categoricalism will run
into difficulties, just as categoricalism has in First Amendment doc-
trine, where the lines between covered and uncovered speech often
blur or cross.  Submachine guns, for example, are arguably both “pis-
tols” (at least as defined in the District of Columbia’s stricken regula-
tions), in that they are “originally designed to be fired by use of a
212 See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2869 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for deter-
mining which weapons are permissible based on what existing regulations permit).
213 Antonin Scalia, Originalism:  The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 864 (1989)
(“Having made that endorsement, I hasten to confess that in a crunch I may prove a faint-
hearted originalist.”).
214 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2828 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
215 United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 294 n.6 (3d Cir. 1996) (Alito, J., dissenting)
(“[A]ppellate judges . . . are not experts on firearms [or] machine guns . . . .”).
216 See supra notes 22–23, 39–43 and accompanying text (contrasting Justice Black’s
absolute categoricalism with his flexibility in defining coverage boundaries of free speech
doctrine).
217 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817.
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single hand,”218 and machine guns, defined by federal statute as “any
weapon which shoots . . . automatically more than one shot, without
manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger.”219  Dick Heller
himself already has filed a lawsuit arguing that the District’s new
statute, which defines semiautomatic pistols as machine guns, “is con-
trary to the ordinary usage of those terms in the English language and
in the laws of the United States.”220  Perhaps these “mixed” guns will
get the kind of intermediate protection under the Second Amendment
that “mixed” speech currently receives under the First.221  But as John
Hart Ely pointed out in the mixed speech context, “burning a draft
card to express opposition to the draft is an undifferentiated whole,
100% action and 100% expression.”222  So, too, can a machine pistol
be considered both 100% a self-defense weapon—and therefore enti-
tled to complete Second Amendment protection223—and 100% a
“dangerous and unusual” weapon—thus subject to categorical exclu-
sion.224  Even drawing clear lines does not always lead to clear
answers.225
218 D.C. CODE § 7-2501.01(12) (2008), invalidated by Heller v. District of Columbia, 128
S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
219 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b) (2006) (defining “machinegun”).
220 Del Quentin Wilber & Paul Duggan, D.C. Is Sued Again over Handgun Rules,
WASH. POST, July 29, 2008, at B1 (quotation marks omitted).
221 See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (“[W]hen ‘speech’ and ‘non-
speech’ elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important
governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limita-
tions on First Amendment freedoms.”); see also Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640,
659 (2000) (calling O’Brien test “intermediate standard of review”); Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 579 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (character-
izing plurality’s test based on O’Brien as “intermediate level of First Amendment
scrutiny”).
222 Ely, supra note 49, at 1495.
223 The Heller majority suggested that the self-defense utility of a gun entitles it to full
categorical protection, basing its decision on the preferability of handguns for self-defense,
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2818, without also considering that the same qualities make handguns
the weapons of choice for criminals. See id. at 2856 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing
significant use of handguns in violent crime).
224 United States v. Fincher, 538 F.3d 868, 874 (8th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 2009 WL
425146 (Feb. 23, 2009) (“[U]nder Heller, . . . [m]achine guns are not in common use by law-
abiding citizens for lawful purposes and therefore fall within the category of dangerous and
unusual weapons that the government can prohibit for individual use.”).
225 In practice, a categoricalist faced with this problem is likely to narrow the categories,
for example by extending Second Amendment protection to commonly used handguns
that are not dangerous or unusual.  (A balancer would almost certainly reach the same
result, albeit by a different path.)  But deciding which category—self-defense or danger-
ousness—must yield is not a problem that Heller’s originalist categoricalism is well
equipped to answer.
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2. The Lack of Classification or Subcategorization (Protection in
Search of Tailoring)
Although Heller relied heavily on categoricalism at the levels of
coverage and protection, it essentially avoided—perhaps in part
because it had little cause to consider—categorization at the level of
classification:  that is, the creation of subcategories that may warrant
only intermediate protection.
The only subcategory the majority seemed to recognize was “the
commercial sale of arms,” which may be subject to “conditions and
qualifications”226—apparently a kind of intermediate scrutiny.  This is
a particularly interesting subcategory, since it has a First Amendment
analogue in the subcategory of commercial speech.  And just as com-
mercial speech receives lessened protection on account of its distance
from the core values of the First Amendment,227 Heller might signal
that commercial arms sales are sufficiently removed from the Second
Amendment’s core value (be it self-defense or the prevention of tyr-
anny) as to receive lower protection.228
But other than the possible example of commercial arms sales,
Heller avoided suggesting that subcategories of covered “Arms,”
“people,” or arms-bearing uses could be covered by the Amendment
and yet subject to less-than-absolute protection.  Of course, because
Heller was the first meaningful Second Amendment case the Court
had heard in seventy years, the opportunities for subcategorization
were limited.  As courts in future cases tailor Second Amendment
doctrine to fit the wide variety of guns, gun owners, and gun uses,
subcategorization is likely to become an increasingly rich area of anal-
ysis.  Are all handguns to be treated the same, or does a Colt Buntline
revolver (the gun Dick Heller sought to possess) get more Second
Amendment protection than an Uzi?  Do security guards or
antigovernment militias have heightened Second Amendment protec-
tion, given their role in effectuating the Amendment’s underlying self-
defense or antityranny values?  Do people living in dangerous neigh-
borhoods have “stronger” Second Amendment rights because of the
heightened need for self-defense?  As Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson
notes, the “array of issues [raised by Heller] rivals and may exceed the
226 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817; see supra text accompanying note 150 (quoting relevant
passage from Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816–17).
227 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
228 A separate “commercial” problem might arise if corporations—which have First
Amendment rights—were to assert something akin to Second Amendment rights, for
example by arguing for a self-defense right that extends to armed security guards.
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number and complexity of subsidiary issues that were eventually
decided by courts in the aftermath of Roe.”229
If First Amendment doctrine is any guide, courts are likely to
apply (consciously or not) balancing analysis to these various subcat-
egories in an attempt to craft constitutional tests that best reflect
underlying constitutional values.  And perhaps, as in First
Amendment doctrine,230 these various balancing approaches will
eventually blend into one another.  If so, it seems likely that reasona-
bleness review—the form of scrutiny universally applied by state
courts considering their own state constitutions’ gun provisions231—
will become the Second Amendment equivalent of First Amendment
intermediate scrutiny, the “Test That Ate Everything” in free speech
doctrine.232  In any event, Heller’s strict categoricalism will make this
a difficult task.  Classification implicitly requires the establishment of
a metric by which to sort different categories and accord them dif-
ferent levels of protection.233  But in Heller, the Court failed to clearly
identify a coherent core value of the Second Amendment and thus
made such analysis difficult.
3. Categorical Protections (A Right in Search of a Value)
As described in Part I, the Court, in interpreting the First
Amendment, essentially eschews categorical protection in the form of
absolute immunity from regulation, except when it comes to certain
speech restrictions—such as viewpoint discrimination—that are
thought to impinge upon, or even run counter to, the central values of
the Amendment.234  In Heller, however, the majority did not clearly
indicate the core Second Amendment value or values upon which the
handgun ban impinged.  Its failure to do so makes it especially diffi-
229 Wilkinson, supra note 3, at 37 (referencing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)); see
also id. at 33 (“Can a non-violent felon be prohibited from owning firearms?  What proce-
dures must be followed before someone is constitutionally classified as ‘mentally ill’ and
thereby stripped of his Second Amendment rights?  Would a park qualify as a ‘sensitive
place’ where guns could be banned in order to protect children?”).
230 See supra Part I.B.4 (describing overlapping balancing approaches in First
Amendment jurisprudence).
231 See Winkler, supra note 133, at 686–87 (describing application by state courts of
“deferential ‘reasonable regulation’ standard in arms rights cases”).
232 See generally Bhagwat, supra note 29 (discussing intermediate scrutiny in First
Amendment context).
233 See supra notes 82–87 and accompanying text (discussing determination of “core” of
constitutional right and how courts protect rights incidental to that core).
234 See supra Part I.B.4; see also Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 52 (1982) (“At the core
of the First Amendment are certain basic conceptions about the manner in which political
discussion in a representative democracy should proceed.”); Corbin, supra note 74, at 613,
614 & n.33 (explaining that “inviolable rule of the First Amendment” is that viewpoint
discrimination is prohibited, although “this rule is frequently broken”).
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cult to justify, in the context of the Second Amendment, the kinds of
value-based categorical protections that apply in certain areas of First
Amendment doctrine.
This is not to say that the majority entirely failed to consider the
values behind the Second Amendment.  The parties and amici sug-
gested three leading candidates:  to protect the state militias from fed-
eral interference,235 to check federal tyranny through a populace of
armed individuals,236 and to enable private self-defense against
criminals and the like.237  But instead of selecting one of these values,
the Court created—“out of whole cloth”238—a new category of use:
“Putting all of these textual elements together, we find that they guar-
antee the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of
confrontation.”239  Of all the dogs in the kennel, this was the one most
likely to chase its own tail.  Since “confrontation” is nearly the only
use for weapons, it provides hardly any guidance at all.  It is like
saying that the First Amendment guarantees an individual right to
speak and act in case of communication, which it does not.240
The majority most likely intended to constitutionalize a “right of
personal self-defense”241—presumably a right to defend oneself with
guns—and indeed the opinion refers to the “core lawful purpose of
self-defense.”242  If armed self-defense is the core value of the Second
Amendment, then, following the First Amendment model, it could be
said that the Second Amendment categorically prohibits laws that ban
the use of arms for personal self-defense (presuming, of course, that
one is not mentally ill, a felon, or using a “dangerous and unusual”
weapon).  Under this reading, the use of “Arms” to “confront” threats
to personal safety is akin to the expression of a political viewpoint
under the First Amendment:  The government cannot present evi-
235 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 133, at 21–22, 26.
236 Respondent’s Brief, supra note 154, at 30–32.
237 Brief Amicus Curiae of the Heartland Institute in Support of Respondent at 3–8, 11,
Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (No. 07-290), 2008 WL 405555.
238 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2828 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“No party or amicus urged this
interpretation; the Court appears to have fashioned it out of whole cloth.”).
239 Id. at 2797 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
240 The majority’s definition might exclude gun collecting and target shooting from
Second Amendment coverage, but little else.  It might also exclude hunting, unless one can
be said to “confront” a deer. See Garry Wills, To Keep and Bear Arms, N.Y. REV. OF
BOOKS, Sept. 21, 1995, at 62, 64 (“One does not bear arms against a rabbit.”).
241 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2847 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
242 Id. at 2818 (majority opinion); see also id. at 2821 (“[W]hatever else [the Second
Amendment] leaves to future evaluation, it surely elevates above all other interests the
right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”);
David B. Kopel, The Natural Right of Self-Defense: Heller’s Lesson for the World, 59
SYRACUSE L. REV. 235, 235–38 (2008) (arguing that Heller constitutionalized right of self-
defense).
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dence to “balance” against that particular use.  This may have been
what the majority meant when it criticized Justice Breyer’s proposal
by saying, “We know of no other enumerated constitutional right
whose core protection has been subjected to a freestanding ‘interest-
balancing’ approach.”243  Of course, as described throughout this
Article, many enumerated constitutional rights—including the right to
free speech—are subject to balancing.244  But more fundamentally, it
is unclear whether the majority truly treated self-defense as the “core
protection” of the Second Amendment.
Despite the majority’s acknowledgement of the value of self-
defense, it elsewhere seemed to adopt the antityranny value urged by
Heller245 and supported by many scholars who favor broad gun
rights.246  Under this reading of the Second Amendment, the majority
noted, “the right secured in 1689 as a result of the Stuarts’ abuses was
by the time of the founding understood to be an individual right pro-
tecting against both public and private violence.”247  The majority
based this conclusion on its historical analysis, which it said “showed
that the way tyrants had eliminated a militia consisting of all the able-
bodied men was not by banning the militia but simply by taking away
the people’s arms, enabling a select militia or standing army to sup-
press political opponents.”248  Following this line of reasoning, the
majority suggested that self-defense in fact had little to do with the
“codification” of the right to bear arms:
[T]he threat that the new Federal Government would destroy the
citizens’ militia by taking away their arms was the reason that
right—unlike some other English rights—was codified in a written
Constitution.  Justice Breyer’s assertion that individual self-defense
is merely a “subsidiary interest” of the right to keep and bear arms
is profoundly mistaken.  He bases that assertion solely upon the
prologue—but that can only show that self-defense had little to do
243 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2821.
244 See, e.g., supra note 113–114 and accompanying text.
245 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 133, at 21–22, 26.
246 See, e.g., Joshua Horwitz & Casey Anderson, Taking Gun Rights Seriously:  The
Insurrectionist Idea and Its Consequences, 1 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 496, 497 (2008) (“Insur-
rectionist ideology holds that government, even in its most democratically accountable
forms, is inevitably the enemy of freedom, and condemns any and all gun regulation as a
government plot to monitor gun ownership (presumably to lay the groundwork for confis-
cation in the event of a political crisis).”); Kopel, supra note 108, at 25 (“The same prin-
ciple should apply to the Second Amendment [as applies to the First]:  the tools of political
dissent should be privately owned and unregistered.”); Lund, supra note 108, at 31 (“An
armed populace—even if it could not serve to deter tyranny as effectively as a legal prohi-
bition against federal standing armies—would still constitute a highly significant obstacle
to the most serious kinds of governmental oppression.”).
247 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2798–99.
248 Id. at 2801.
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with the right’s codification; it was the central component of the
right itself.249
But by divorcing the “central component” of the Second Amendment
from the reason for the Amendment’s inclusion in the Constitution,
the majority made it all but impossible to identify a “fixed star” to
guide Second Amendment analysis.250
The majority’s failure to identify a core purpose of the Second
Amendment makes it very difficult to create principled limitations on
the right it protects.  This is why the majority’s attempt to carve out an
exclusion for “sensitive places such as schools and government build-
ings”251 is unsatisfying.  “Sensitive” to what?  Is all government prop-
erty “sensitive”?  If a purpose of the Second Amendment is to allow
individuals to arm themselves against government tyranny—as Heller
argued and the majority seemed to accept—then it makes little sense
to prevent the bearing of arms in government buildings, which is
where they arguably would be most needed to prevent government
tyranny.  Similarly, the exclusion of “dangerous and unusual
weapons”252 is completely inconsistent with (and indeed runs counter
to) an antityranny reading of the Second Amendment, since bombs,
rocket launchers, and other dangerous weapons are precisely the
kinds of weapons one would need to repel (or even deter) an oppres-
sive federal government.
If, on the other hand, the core value of the Second Amendment is
self-defense, it seems odd that felons and the mentally ill should be
prohibited categorically from invoking it.  Felons, in particular, are
likely to move in circles where self-defense is an imperative.253  One
might argue, of course, that the dangers of allowing felons to own
guns outweigh their constitutional right to armed self-defense.  But
this is precisely the kind of position that is unavailable to originalist
categoricalists.  And even then, the rule would be overbroad since
there is little reason to think that nonviolent felons pose any special
risk of gun violence.  Nor, on the self-defense reading of the Second
Amendment, would it make sense to categorically exclude “Arms”
249 Id. (citation omitted).
250 Cf. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“If there is any
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can pre-
scribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion
. . . .”).
251 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816–17.
252 Id. at 2817.
253 See, e.g., United States v. Gomez, 92 F.3d 770, 778 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that
district court erred by prohibiting admission of justification defense in felon-in-possession
case where defendant obtained prohibited gun to defend himself from extraordinary
threats from criminal associates).
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that lack a military purpose, as the majority does.  Such military relat-
edness (or lack thereof) should be entirely irrelevant to an
Amendment whose core value is self-defense.  And if self-defense is
truly categorically protected, it is difficult to see how any criminal law
can survive after Heller without an explicit self-defense exception,
since all such laws presumably could burden the exercise of self-
defense rights (with or without guns) in certain circumstances.  The
alternative implication would be that citizens have a constitutional
right to self-defense by “Arms” but not by other means, such as their
bare hands.  This would certainly be a “startling”254 reading of the
Constitution.
Such over- and underbreadth is part and parcel of any categorical
approach.  As Schauer notes, “[r]ules get interesting . . . when some
member of the category is within the category as stated but not within
the background justification.”255  And, as noted in Part I, such results
may be excluded categorically so long as the government’s purpose in
passing a law is not contrary to the purpose of the Amendment itself.
Thus, for example, the Supreme Court upholds incidental burdens on
speech so long as they do not facially target core First Amendment
values like the protection of unpopular viewpoints or political
dissent.256
But the lack of an identifiable core Second Amendment value
makes the purposivist approach all but impossible to apply to gun con-
trol laws.  If the Amendment’s aim is to protect a right to self-defense,
then laws whose purpose—not incidental impact, but purpose—is the
prevention of self-defense would be unconstitutional, just like laws
whose purpose is to burden free expression.257  This inquiry, of course,
would be useless in practice since it is all but impossible to imagine
any legislature passing a law whose purpose is the prevention of self-
defense.  In other words, Second Amendment purposivism nearly
always would come up empty if the purpose of the Amendment were
to protect self-defense.
254 Cf. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2815 (noting that Second Amendment could be read to pro-
tect only weapons useful in warfare but that this result would be “startling”).
255 Schauer, supra note 14, at 75; see also Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in
Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1695 (1976) (“The use of rules, as
opposed to standards, to deter immoral or antisocial conduct means that sometimes per-
fectly innocent behavior will be punished, and that sometimes plainly guilty behavior will
escape sanction.”).
256 See supra notes 82–83 and accompanying text (discussing how Court treats incidental
burdens on speech).
257 See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 29, at 768 (“[A] person who breaks a law not
directed at speech can claim no constitutional immunity just because he was acting for
expressive reasons.  There is no First Amendment ‘pass’ from a law whose purpose is not
to punish speech.”).
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Similarly, if the underlying purpose of the Second Amendment is
to protect individuals’ right to arm themselves against federal tyranny,
then any effort by the government to disarm people for the purpose of
oppressing them would be flatly impermissible, even if the people
being disarmed were felons or the guns being carried were “dangerous
and unusual.”  Holding aside the probability that, regardless of any
Second Amendment implications, a court would strike down any law
whose stated purpose is oppression, such disarmament-for-oppression
laws are far removed from modern debates over gun control, and it is
difficult to imagine any individual actually raising or prevailing on
such a claim.  Many people question the wisdom of gun control, and
some argue that it has the effect of burdening armed insurrection, but
few argue that gun control measures are intended to oppress.  Again,
purposivism would be of little use in advancing the constitutional
debate over the modern meaning of the Second Amendment, at least
under the majority’s implied reading of Second Amendment purposes
as self-defense and defense against tyranny.
Lest this discussion of Second Amendment categoricalism draw
an unfair comparison, it should be noted again that neither First
Amendment doctrine nor balancing analysis more generally has
achieved satisfying coherence, largely due to their own failures to
identify core values.  After all, balancing also requires the establish-
ment of a metric:  “Nothing can be balanced against anything else
without a common unit of measure.  What is the unit of measure when
First Amendment rights are ‘weighed’ against governmental interests?
No court has ever said.”258  But Second Amendment doctrine should
not be commended for achieving, in a single decision, the kind of inco-
herence that it took the First Amendment nearly a century to culti-
vate.  Nor does Heller’s defensibility as an act of living
constitutionalism make it any more satisfying as a purported exercise
in originalist categoricalism.  With a better-defined central value and a
better-explained framework of review, the Second Amendment’s
future could, at the very least, be less murky than the First
Amendment’s past.
As Part III suggests, balancing approaches may be better
equipped to deal with a pluralism of values and with areas where
underlying values are disputed.  Many interests can be added to the
scale without destroying it.  And in the context of disputed values,
categories are likely to be particularly unstable and unwieldy.  The
problems of under- and overbreadth that inevitably accompany cate-
gorical or rule-based approaches may lead to situations in which one
258 Id. at 788.
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acknowledged value (such as prevention of tyranny) would clearly
extend constitutional protection to a particular category (such as
weapons with military utility), while another acknowledged value
(such as self-defense) would just as clearly exclude the same category.
In such a situation, it may be difficult or even impossible to create
categories by reference to first principles.  Balancing approaches, on
the other hand, give courts the opportunity to weigh competing values
in a series of cases, and if one value consistently outweighs the other, a
categorical rule may develop.
III
CATEGORICALISM, INTERPRETATION, AND THE ROLE OF
THE COURTS
Because Heller essentially gave the Court a rare blank canvas on
which to paint constitutional doctrine, the majority’s selection of a cat-
egorical palette is especially significant.  Indeed, the Court’s endorse-
ment of categoricalism in Heller may signal the majority’s view of the
proper role of categoricalism, the common law, and the role of courts
more generally.259
A. Categoricalism, the Common Law, and
“Narrow” Decisionmaking
Chief Justice Roberts, it is said, “tries to define the principle in
question as narrowly as possible.”260  In his own words, “In most
cases, I think the narrower the better, because people will be less con-
cerned about it.”261  This view of the judicial role essentially embraces
the common law ideal of incremental development of legal principles
through narrow, case-by-case decisionmaking.262
But there is nothing necessarily “narrow” about categoricalism.
In fact, in the early free speech cases, balancing was considered to be
the narrower approach:  “Balancing suggested a particularistic, case-
by-case, common law approach that accommodated gradual change
259 See Sullivan, supra note 12, at 112–22 (describing how “[d]ifferent conceptions of
judicial role emerge from the Justices’ two different patterns of choices among constitu-
tional rules and standards”).
260 Jeffrey Rosen, Roberts’s Rules, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan./Feb. 2007, at 110, available
at http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/print/200701/john-roberts.
261 Id.
262 Scalia, supra note 13, at 1177 (“[N]ot relying upon overarching generalizations, and
thereby leaving considerable room for future judges[,] is thought to be the genius of the
common-law system.”); see also Philip B. Kurland, Jurisdiction of the United States
Supreme Court:  Time for a Change?, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 616, 618 (1974) (describing
courts’ lawmaking power as “genius of the common law system that we inherited from our
English forbears”).
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and rejected absolutes.”263  Justice O’Connor, herself no absolutist,
described this as “the sounder approach . . . more consistent with our
role as judges to decide each case on its individual merits.”264
Categoricalism can be narrow, of course, but only if the catego-
ries themselves are.  One way to create narrow categories is to adopt
(as First Amendment doctrine often has) only those categories that
have been refined through repeated balancing—a kind of “common
law categoricalism.”  As explained above, and as the Court itself has
noted, “categorical decisions may be appropriate and individual cir-
cumstances disregarded when a case fits into a genus in which the bal-
ance characteristically tips in one direction.”265  That is, if balancing
favors the government in ninety-nine out of one hundred obscenity
cases (or maybe even in nine out of ten), courts may see no need to
balance again in the hundred and first (or eleventh) case and can
safely presume that the government will prevail once again.  The
Court’s “experience” with such repeated balancings may, as Sullivan
notes, eventually lead it to establish “categories [that] may be ratio-
nalized as merely the precipitate of earlier balancing that always hap-
pens to come out the same way.”266  Thus in Heller, Justice Breyer
strongly advocated a balancing approach to Second Amendment anal-
ysis267 but nonetheless noted (with a nod to Justice Holmes268) that
“[e]xperience as much as logic has led the Court to decide that in one
area of constitutional law or another the interests are likely to prove
stronger on one side of a typical constitutional case than on the
other.”269  So long as there are enough cases to sufficiently tailor the
263 Aleinikoff, supra note 61, at 961.
264 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 899 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (ana-
lyzing Free Exercise Clause).
265 U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 776
(1989), quoted in Scalia, supra note 13, at 1183.
266 Sullivan, supra note 15, at 295 n.6; see id. at 300 (describing eventual adoption of
categorical rule in free exercise exemption cases); id. at 311 (“Each of these distinctions
(public forum/nonpublic forum, public speech/private speech, extracurricular/curricular,
and penalty/non-subsidy) has been precipitated into a rule from an implicit prior weighing
of substantive values.”); see also Schlag, supra note 13, at 425 (noting that “[c]ertainly . . .
examples of this transubstantiation of standards into rules” exist but also noting
counterexamples).
267 See supra Part II.B.2.
268 See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 5 (Transaction Publishers
2005) (1881) (“The life of the law has not been logic:  [I]t has been experience.”).
269 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2852–53 (2008) (Breyer, J., dis-
senting); see also id. at 2853 (“Here, we have little prior experience.  Courts that do have
experience in these matters have uniformly taken an approach that treats empirically-
based legislative judgment with a degree of deference.”); Winkler, supra note 133, at 686
(“Forty-two states have constitutional provisions guaranteeing an individual right to bear
arms and, tellingly, the courts of every state to consider the question apply a deferential
‘reasonable regulation’ standard in arms rights cases.”).
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doctrine, this kind of common law categoricalism should be able to
avoid many of the problems of over- and underinclusion.
Categories developed through common law categoricalism “pro-
mote economies for the judicial decisionmaker by minimizing the
elaborate, time-consuming, and repetitive application of background
principles to facts.”270  These balancing-based categories, like all other
categories, essentially preclude the exercise of judicial discretion271—
“once the categories are established, further ad hoc balancing is cut
off”272—but they are nonetheless a product of it.  Unlike categories
created out of whole cloth in the first instance, they represent the con-
sidered judgment of courts over the course of many cases:  the “genius
of the common law.”273
But not all categorical tests are honed and shaped through a his-
tory of repeated balancing.  Some categorical tests, such as Heller’s,
burst fully armored from the Justices’ foreheads.274  Such categories
are usually justified on originalist or textualist grounds.  Justice Black,
for example, defended his First Amendment absolutism by saying, “It
is my belief that there are ‘absolutes’ in our Bill of Rights, and that
they were put there on purpose by men who knew what words meant,
and meant their prohibitions to be ‘absolutes.’”275  Justice Scalia
embraces a similar view:  “Just as that manner of [‘plain meaning’]
textual exegesis facilitates the formulation of general rules, so does, in
the constitutional field, adherence to a more or less originalist theory
of construction.”276  Applying such an approach in Crawford v.
Washington277—a case that, like Heller, involved a right to “confron-
270 Sullivan, supra note 12, at 63.
271 See infra Part III.B (describing how categorical approach in Heller reduced discre-
tion of lower courts deciding individual cases and increased power of Supreme Court
establishing categories).
272 Sullivan, supra note 15, at 295 n.6.
273 See sources cited supra note 262 (describing “genius of the common law”).
274 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2828 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing majority’s holding as
creating definitions “out of whole cloth”).  Kathleen Sullivan notes:
One camp, epitomized by Justice Scalia, favors a flexible approach to prece-
dent but favors rules at the interpretive and operative levels.  The other camp,
epitomized by the Casey joint opinion authors—Justices O’Connor, Kennedy
and Souter—favors a rule of adherence to precedent but favors standards at
the levels of interpreting precedents and constitutional text and fashioning
operative doctrines.
Sullivan, supra note 12, at 112–13 (referencing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992)).
275 Black, supra note 152, at 867.
276 Scalia, supra note 13, at 1184; see also id. (“[E]ven if one rejects an originalist
approach, it is easier to arrive at categorical rules if one acknowledges that the content of
evolving concepts is strictly limited by the actual practices of the society, as reflected in the
laws enacted by its legislatures.”).
277 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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tation,” albeit in a different context (that of the Sixth Amendment’s
Confrontation Clause)—the Court adopted a categorical rule barring
the use at trial of statements made to police by an unavailable wit-
ness.278  The Court found an originalist basis for this sharply defined
rule, writing that the Framers “knew that judges, like other govern-
ment officers, could not always be trusted to safeguard the rights of
the people. . . . By replacing categorical constitutional guarantees with
open-ended balancing tests, we do violence to their design.”279
Notably, Justice Scalia authored the majority opinions in both
Crawford and Giles v. California,280 another Sixth Amendment case,
in which he wrote that “[i]t is not the role of courts to extrapolate
from the words of the Sixth Amendment to the values behind it, and
then to enforce its guarantees only to the extent they serve (in the
courts’ views) those underlying values.”281
The basis for this approach seems to be a presumption that the
Court can identify “original” categories and then trace their modern
descendants.  As Chief Justice Roberts said at oral argument in Heller,
discussing the constitutionality of reasonable limitations on gun own-
ership:  “[Y]ou would define ‘reasonable’ in light of the restrictions
that existed at the time the amendment was adopted. . . . [W]e are
talking about lineal descendents of the arms but presumably there are
lineal descendents of the restrictions as well.”282  But, like the court of
appeals below,283 the majority in Heller failed to establish any mean-
ingful relationship between modern categories and their historical
ancestors.  Nowhere was this more evident than in the Court’s treat-
ment of the District’s safe-storage law284—the very subject of Chief
Justice Roberts’s comment—which had clear historical ancestors that
the majority failed to distinguish on any principled basis.  And, as
278 Id. at 68–69.
279 Id. at 67–68.
280 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008).
281 Id. at 2692.  Indeed, the Court seems to have embraced categoricalism in a few
notable recent criminal procedure cases. See generally Fisher, supra note 14, at 1506–10
(describing Crawford and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), which was also
authored by Justice Scalia).  The Court’s decision in Kennedy v. Louisiana, rendered the
day before Heller, created a categorical constitutional prohibition on the use of capital
punishment for crimes that do not result in death.  128 S. Ct. 2641, 2665 (2008).
282 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 77; see also id. at 44 (“Isn’t it enough
to determine the scope of the existing right that the amendment refers to, look at the
various regulations that were available at the time . . . and determine . . . how this restric-
tion and the scope of this right looks in relation to those?”).
283 See Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 398 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (concluding
that pistol, rifle, and long-barreled shotgun are logical descendants of Founding-era
weapons).
284 See supra notes 154–62 and accompanying text (discussing safe storage law).
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explained above,285 it is simply impossible to trace the “descendants”
of the original categories without knowing something about the princi-
ples behind them.  Modern blogs are descendants of political pam-
phlets not because the Internet is a descendant of the printing press, a
concept which is irrelevant to the First Amendment, but because both
blogs and pamphlets are—or can be—methods of expressing view-
points, a concept which is central to the First Amendment.
But Heller failed to identify its underlying values, making it diffi-
cult for future courts to recognize any lineal descendants of the orig-
inal categories ascertained by the Court in Heller.  Already, lower
courts have begun to fill in the blanks in the majority’s analysis, using
the same kind of judicial discretion the majority seemed to abhor.  In
United States v. Booker, for instance, the district court found no
“meaningful distinction between felons and persons convicted of
crimes of domestic violence as predictors of firearm violence”286 and
therefore added “persons who have been convicted of a misdemeanor
crime of domestic violence” to the list of people who are categorically
excluded from Second Amendment coverage.287  If the Booker court
is right, and the likelihood of firearm violence is the guiding principle
behind the categories, then perhaps future courts will carve out nonvi-
olent felons from the ambit of the felon exception.  This might be
defensible, or even desirable, but it is in no way compelled by the
Heller majority’s valueless approach.288
The Court’s awkward treatment of “original” categories reflects a
deeply conflicted view of common law adjudication.  On the one hand,
the majority did not trust judges to balance the newly created “indi-
vidual” Second Amendment right, nor even to continue applying the
well-established common law self-defense exception.  On the other
hand, the majority implicitly adopted prior common law balancing by
finding that the Second Amendment protects a right to use arms for
traditionally “lawful” purposes like the common law right to self-
defense289—a category of uses entirely defined by past laws and opin-
ions, many of which would have been unconstitutional had they been
evaluated under the majority’s approach.  In a similarly conflicted pas-
sage about the prefatory clause and the effectiveness of a modern
militia, the majority acknowledged that “it may be true that no
285 See supra notes 192–94 and accompanying text.
286 570 F. Supp. 2d 161, 164 (D. Me. 2008).
287 Id.
288 Despite the apparently clear lines it draws, the majority’s approach does little to
encourage national uniformity because it leaves to future courts the task of fleshing out its
sparse framework.
289 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2815–16 (2008).
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amount of small arms could be useful against modern-day bombers
and tanks.  But the fact that modern developments have limited the
degree of fit between the prefatory clause and the protected right
cannot change our interpretation of the right.”290  However, it is not
“modern developments” that have “limited the degree of fit” or made
it difficult for the people to arm themselves effectively against the fed-
eral government.  Rather, it is a history of regulation, approved both
explicitly and implicitly by courts, denying “the people” the ability to
purchase rocket launchers, tanks, and missiles.
This demonstrates another potentially important difference
between starting from categoricalism and starting from balancing:
While balancing may eventually evolve into categoricalism through
the usual mechanisms of common law, the reverse is not equally true.
Where categoricalism has led to seemingly unacceptable results, the
Court has instead attempted to cure the defects with more categori-
calism—for example, by using categorical exclusions to carve out the
disfavored results of categorical protection.291  Thus balancing may
eventually calcify into a category, but categories tend to beget more
categories, either in the form of categorical exclusions or in the form
of subcategories.
The evolution of the exclusionary rule is representative.  In a
series of cases culminating in Mapp v. Ohio,292 the Court created a
categorical rule that unconstitutionally seized evidence must be sup-
pressed at trial.293  But, over time, the Justices decided that this rule
was too costly—an evaluation, of course, that is only intelligible in the
context of some background constitutional value, such as the fair and
practical administration of justice—and began to carve out categorical
exceptions.  Holding true to this categorical approach, the Court has
since held that the exclusionary rule categorically does not apply
where an officer has relied in good faith on a faulty warrant,294 where
a warrant was faulty because of a court clerk’s error,295 or where the
evidence was seized as the result of a knock-and-announce viola-
290 Id. at 2817.
291 As Schauer notes, such “rule-revision by judges might be a necessary pressure-
release valve from rules the under- or over-inclusion of which would otherwise produce
results of such unjustness or silliness as to exceed the capacity of a society to tolerate
them.”  Schauer, supra note 13, at 687; see also infra notes 292–96 and accompanying text
(discussing creation of exceptions to exclusionary rule).
292 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
293 Id. at 646–55; see also Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392
(1920) (Holmes, J.) (applying exclusionary rule).
294 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913 (1984).
295 Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 16 (1995).
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tion.296  Critically, however, there is some room for balancing in the
construction of these categories:  Evidence will not be excluded where
the social cost of suppression outweighs the deterrence value of exclu-
sion.297  Though a product of balancing, the exclusionary rule is not a
balancing test—a defendant may not argue that in his particular case,
despite the usual rules, deterrence would be effective enough to justify
the cost.  And just as important for the present discussion, the cate-
gorical lines—as in First Amendment doctrine—are moored to back-
ground constitutional values:  deterring police misconduct while
minimizing the social cost of excluding probative evidence.298
All this is to say that where constitutional doctrine ends up may
well depend on where it starts.  The Second Amendment, like the
First, might end up as a patchwork of categorical and balancing tests.
But in order to get there in any kind of principled fashion, courts will
need to better identify the values of the Second Amendment.  By
failing to do so, and by evincing an apparent distrust of the common
law, Heller has made this a difficult task.
B. Increasing Judicial Power, Limiting Judicial Discretion
Categoricalism is above all a means of allocating decisionmaking
power,299 and Heller’s categoricalism is no exception.  But although
categorization may at first appear—and has often been justified—as a
limitation on judicial power, Heller demonstrates that it is more prop-
erly described as a limitation on judicial discretion that increases the
power of the category creator (here, the Supreme Court) and limits
the power of the lower courts in individual cases.
One matter on which the Justices in Heller all seemed to agree
was that judges should not actively be involved in decisions regarding
gun control.  Justice Stevens bemoaned the fact that the majority
opinion “will surely give rise to a far more active judicial role in
making vitally important national policy decisions than was envisioned
296 Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 599 (2006).
297 See, e.g., Leon, 468 U.S. at 906–07 (weighing deterrent benefits against costs of
exclusion).
298 See Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998) (“[W]e have held [the
exclusionary rule] to be applicable only where its deterrence [of police misconduct] out-
weigh[s] its ‘substantial social costs.’”).
299 See Schauer, supra note 13, at 647 (discounting “frequently overstated arguments for
certainty and predictability, and instead concentrat[ing] largely on rules as devices for the
allocation of power”); see also Schauer, supra note 14, at 83 (“[W]e must understand the
ways in which rules operate as instruments for the allocation of power.”); id. at 84 (“I do
want to suggest . . . that evaluating the appeal of ruleness cannot take place without con-
fronting the question of who is making the constitutional decision.”).
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at any time in the 18th, 19th, or 20th centuries.”300  Justice Breyer
agreed, saying that he could “find no sound legal basis for launching
the courts on so formidable and potentially dangerous a mission.”301
And for Justice Scalia, the promotion of judicial restraint has always
been one of the cardinal virtues of the rule-like categorical approach
the majority applied.  In his account, the standard-like balancing
approach both demands too much of judges and gives them too much
in return:  “Only by announcing rules do we hedge ourselves in”; bal-
ancing, by contrast, permits judges to be guided by their “political or
policy preferences”302 in a particular case.  Unsurprisingly, then, his
opinion for the Heller majority characterized Justice Breyer’s bal-
ancing approach as “judge-empowering” and said that “[t]he very
enumeration of the right takes out of the hands of government—even
the Third Branch of Government—the power to decide on a case-by-
case basis whether the right is really worth insisting upon.”303  Justice
Breyer took “this criticism seriously,” but did “not think it accu-
rate.”304  He acknowledged that his own approach, “of course,
requires judgment, but the very nature of the approach . . . limits the
judge’s choices; and the method’s necessary transparency lays bare the
judge’s reasoning for all to see and to criticize.”305  He finished:  “The
majority’s methodology is, in my view, substantially less transparent
than mine.”306
The majority’s characterization of balancing tests as not only
opaque but “judge-empowering”—a charge that also has been made
by Justice Black, among others307—was not necessarily accurate.  To
300 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2847 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens continued:
The Court would have us believe that over 200 years ago, the Framers made a
choice to limit the tools available to elected officials wishing to regulate civilian
uses of weapons, and to authorize this Court to use the common-law process of
case-by-case judicial lawmaking to define the contours of acceptable gun con-
trol policy.
Id.; see also Posner, supra note 3, at 33 (“The Framers of the Bill of Rights could not have
been thinking of the crime problem in the large crime-ridden metropolises of twenty-first-
century America, and it is unlikely that they intended to freeze American government two
centuries hence at their eighteenth-century level of understanding.”).
301 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2870 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2860 (arguing for
judicial deference to policy judgment of local legislature).
302 Scalia, supra note 13, at 1179–80 (arguing that rules-based approach precludes indul-
gence in these preferences).
303 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2821.
304 Id. at 2868 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
305 Id.
306 Id.
307 See Black, supra note 152, at 878 (“[A] balancing approach to basic individual liber-
ties assumes to legislators and judges more power than either the Framers or I myself
believe should be entrusted, without limitation, to any man or any group of men.”);
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the contrary, balancing often goes hand in hand with deference to the
legislature.  In free speech doctrine, “[a]d hoc balancing gained its
dismal first amendment reputation in large part because its chief pro-
ponent, Justice Frankfurter, held as well a theory of great deference to
legislative determinations.”308  Justice Breyer seems to have inherited
Frankfurter’s preferences both for balancing and for deferring to the
legislature.309
Far from limiting judicial power, categorical opinions like Heller
tend to increase it by giving judges the extraordinary responsibility of
striking down popularly enacted legislation.  While limiting judicial
discretion is the very purpose of categoricalism,310 it inevitably
increases the power of those who establish the categories in the first
place.  And since it is usually higher courts—particularly the Supreme
Court—that create categorical rules, categoricalism does not reduce
the power wielded by the judiciary as a whole but simply takes it away
from trial judges weighing interests in individual cases and gives it to
appellate judges.
CONCLUSION
Categoricalism does not absolve judges of the difficult task of
identifying constitutional values, and Heller’s purportedly originalist
categoricalism risks incoherence by creating legal categories that are
not grounded in any such values.  The Court has confronted this
problem before.  Indeed, it has struggled for decades to draw coherent
categorical lines in First Amendment doctrine.  Although balancing
tests generally prevail, categories and subcategories persist, sometimes
as a result of repeated balancing.  The resulting patchwork of categor-
Sullivan, supra note 12, at 118 (“The vaguer and more unpredictable [a standard’s] exten-
sion to the next situation with slightly different facts, the more it transfers power from the
political branches to the courts.”).
308 Schauer, supra note 34, at 303 (citing Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 524–25,
542 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); WALLACE MENDELSON, JUSTICES BLACK AND
FRANKFURTER:  CONFLICT IN THE COURT 119–20 (1961)).
309 See Jack Wade Nowlin, The Judicial Restraint Amendment:  Populist Constitutional
Reform in the Spirit of the Bill of Rights, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 171, 266 n.390 (2002)
(noting “Justice Breyer’s tendency to defer to Congress as a co-equal branch of govern-
ment and his deference to government more generally”); see also United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 617–29 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing for deference to legislature
with regard to Gun Free School Zones Act).
310 See Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 774
(1996) (Souter, J., concurring) (“Reviewing speech regulations under fairly strict categor-
ical rules keeps the starch in the standards for those moments when the daily politics cries
loudest for limiting what may be said.”); see also Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspec-
tive and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 474 (1985) (“[C]ourts . . . should
place a premium on confining the range of discretion left to future decisionmakers who will
be called upon to make judgments when pathological pressures are most intense.”).
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ical and balancing tests is tied by a very fine thread to the presumed
core values of the First Amendment, such as protecting political
speech and preventing viewpoint discrimination.  The next few
decades are likely to see a similar struggle over categoricalism and
balancing in the Second Amendment and perhaps a better explana-
tion of that Amendment’s core values.
It has been said that “the choice between [categorization and bal-
ancing] cannot successfully be explained by general constitutional
theory,”311 and it also may be true that the choice is at some level a
“misleading oversimplification.”312  But it is an oversimplification that
nevertheless demands attention313 because it has consequences for the
characterization and shape of constitutional law.  In addition to deter-
mining doctrinal rules, the Court’s selection of a categorical or bal-
ancing approach may reveal—or construct—constitutional values.  At
the very least, “categorization and balancing are practically if not logi-
cally distinct.  Rhetorically they call forth very different efforts.  And
such differences give shifts between the modes their dynamic power—
that’s why the Court treats them as worth fighting over.”314  The fight
rarely produces clear winners, and the resulting map of categorical
and balancing tests generally reflects an uneasy doctrinal de´tente.  But
the possibility that the Second Amendment may eventually achieve
this de´tente does not mean that it already has.
Near the end of the majority opinion in Heller, Justice Scalia sug-
gests that “there will be time enough to expound upon the historical
justifications for the exceptions we have mentioned if and when those
exceptions come before [the Court].”315  Indeed, there will be time yet
for a hundred decisions (and for a hundred scholarly visions and revi-
sions316) about the constitutional right that Heller created.  But by
311 Sullivan, supra note 15, at 317.
312 Schauer, supra note 13, at 653 n.11.
313 See Rubenfeld, supra note 29, at 788 (“The debate over balancing in free speech
jurisprudence and elsewhere in constitutional law is an old story.  But it is worth the atten-
tion it gets.”).
314 Sullivan, supra note 15, at 309; see also Robert F. Nagel, Liberals and Balancing, 63
U. COLO. L. REV. 319, 319 (1992) (“I agree that it can make some difference whether
judges employ balancing tests instead of categorical tests.”); Sullivan, supra note 12, at 59
(“When categorical formulas operate, the key move in litigation is to characterize the facts
to fit them into the preferred category.” (internal citation omitted)).
315 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821 (2008).
316 As T.S. Eliot wrote:
There will be time, there will be time
. . . .
There will be time to murder and create,
. . . .
And time yet for a hundred indecisions,
And for a hundred visions and revisions . . . .
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casting the Second Amendment framework as categorical—subject to
“exceptions” rather than “regulation”—the majority has set the
Second Amendment on the First Amendment’s road not taken.
Whether that road leads gun-related rights to a similar destination as
free speech remains to be seen.
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